American University International Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 5

Article 2

2007

Business & Human Rights Law: Diverging Trends
in the United States and France
Anna Triponel

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Triponel, Anna. "Business & Human Rights Law: Diverging Trends in the United States and France." American University
International Law Review 23, no.5 (2007): 855-913.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
DIVERGING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND FRANCE
ANNA TRIPONEL*

IN TRO DU CTION ...........................................................................
856
I. AMERICAN AND FRENCH METHODS FOR APPLYING
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO CORPORATIONS ................. 862
A. PRIMARY ACTORS IN ENSURING COMPANIES COMPLY
W ITH H UMAN RIGHTS ......................................................

862

1. States As Primary Actors ........................................... 862
2. Human Rights Affected by Business Activity ............. 867
B. DIVERGING METHODS OF ENSURING COMPANY
COMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ................................ 874
1. Regulation of CorporateActivities ............................ 874
2. Holding the State Accountable for Corporate
Human Rights Violations........................................... 879

II. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW TO AMERICAN AND FRENCH COMPANIES ....... 885
A. FROM VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES TO BINDING
O BLIGATION S ................................................................... 885

1. CorporateVoluntary Initiatives to Comply with
H um an R ights ............................................................
885
2. Towards Binding Obligationson Corporations......... 891

The author is a New York attorney and French jurist. She holds a French
Juris Doctor from Paris X Nanterre and an LL.M. degree from American
University. She has practiced international law at the World Bank, Washington
D.C. and currently practices international corporate law in New York and Europe.
This Article is dedicated to the author's grandfather, the late Lord Harris of High
Cross, for showing her that ideas can change the world. The author would like to
thank Professor Robert Goldman, Juan Manuel Quesada Delgado, and Christine
Laroque for comments on various drafts. A heartfelt thanks goes to Professor
Sophie Smyth and Professor Paul Williams for their non-relenting guidance and
support.

AM. U.INT'L L. REV.

[23:855

B. ENSURING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ............................
898

1. CorporateComplicity in Human Rights Abuse ..........
898
2. Holding Companies Accountablefor Human
R ights A buse .............................................................. 904
C ON C LU SIO N ............................................................................... 912

INTRODUCTION
The application of human rights standards to the activities of
transnational corporations has become an increasingly prominent
debate in the international law and business arenas.' Companies have
long been subject to government regulation in areas such as workers'
rights, consumer protection, and the environment. The novelty
however "is the degree to which ...

expectations [for corporations]

are being recast in human rights terms, and the degree to which new
human rights claims are being advanced in relation to the private
2
sector."

1. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the
Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:
Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business
Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights,
20,
U.N.
Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), http://www.globalpolicy.org/
socecon/tncs/2003/08ecosonorms.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Norms] (defining a
transnational corporation as "an economic entity operating in more than one
country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countrieswhatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity,
and whether taken individually or collectively"); see also OFFICE OF THE U.N.
HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PROGRESS

REPORT 15, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Business
HRen.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); Official Website of Business & Human
Rights Resource Centre, http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home (last visited
Apr. 9, 2008); Official Website of The Human Rights & Business Project,
http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); Official Website
of Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, http://blihr.org/ (last visited Apr.
9, 2008); Official Website of Amnesty Int'l USA, http://www.amnestyusa.org
/index.html (follow "Our Issues: Business and Human Rights") (last visited Apr. 9,
2008); Official Website of Int'l Council on Human Rights Pol'y: Business and
Human Rights, http://www.ichrp.org/index.html (follow "English" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 9, 2008); Corporate Accountability, http://www.corporateaccountability.org/eng/ (last visited Apr. 9,2008).
2. INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL'Y, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INT'L LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES
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In March 2007, the debate evolved significantly as U.N. Special
Representative John Ruggie presented his report "Business and
Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility
and Accountability for Corporate Acts" to the United Nations
Human Rights Council.3 Ruggie emphasized the urgency of
developing practical solutions and highlighted that "no single silver
bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge." 4 As the
international community moves forward in elaborating a framework
for accountability for corporate acts, it will be crucial that this
framework reflect the existing differences between legal systems in
applying human rights law to corporations' operations.
The debate over human rights standards for businesses particularly
affects Europe and the United States, where the majority of the
transnational corporations are incorporated. 5 Furthermore, with the
United States and France predicted to be among the top three
developed countries for foreign direct investment, the study of the
application of human rights law to transnational corporations
headquartered in their territories becomes all the more relevant.6
The emergence of international human rights law is a relatively
recent phenomenon, and the consideration that business should

1 (2002), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/7/1O7_-_Business
_andHumanRights -Main_.Report.pdf [hereinafter BEYOND VOLUNTARISM].
3. See generally U.N. Human Rights Council, Report on the Issue of Human
Rights and TransnationalCorporations and Other Business Enterprises,Business
and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and
Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007)
(prepared by John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General)
[hereinafter Ruggie Report].
4. Id. 24.
5. See ECOSOC, Day of General Discussion: Globalization and Its Impact on
the Enjoyment of Economic and Social Rights (Arts. 6, 7, & 8), 2, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/1998/7 (Apr. 24, 1998) (preparedby Alejandro Teitelbaum) (describing the
prevalence of U.S.-based multinational corporations in "export processing zones").
But see U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Division on Investment, Technology
and Enterprise Dev., Transnational Corporations,UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/9 (Dec.
2004) (preparedby Alan Rugman & Alain Verbeke) (noting that, although France
is home to several of the most "transnationalized" corporations, the United States
is actually home to none, given that U.S. corporations dedicate a large portion of
their business to the domestic market).
6. See Press Release, U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., New Take-Off
Predicted for FDI, UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2004/005 (Apr. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.cgitoronto.ca/UNCTADonFDI.htm.
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respect certain fundamental rights even more so. Before the Second
World War, international law maintained that the way governments
treated their citizens was a matter shielded by national sovereignty
and therefore did not concern any other government. 7 After the
atrocities committed during the Second World War, however, the
concept of international human rights emerged and the conduct of
governments toward their own citizens became a concern of
international law.8 The United Nations was thus created in 1945 to
"achieve international cooperation in ... promoting and encouraging

respect for human rights"9 and committed itself to promoting
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights,"' 0 a purpose
which member states agreed to help achieve."I
The international texts enumerating human rights have
subsequently multiplied. The first international document to set forth
a list of human rights-from civil and political rights to economic
and social rights-was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
of 1948 ("UDHR"). 2 Subsequent binding treaties have been agreed
upon by states, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR") 3 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") of December 16,

7. See D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 470 (3d
ed. 1983) (noting that international law regarded human rights violations by
individuals as "being within the jurisdiction of sovereign states"); see also Louis
HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS

73 (1999) (asserting that, prior to the 1930s, "how

a state treated its own inhabitants was not a matter of legitimate international
concern").
8. Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights
Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963, 1963 (1996) (stating that the
establishment of the U.N. Charter and the Nuremberg trials erased the notion that
the protection of human rights "lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
sovereign state" instead of with the international community at large).
9. U.N. Charter art. 1, 3.
10. Id. art. 55(c).
11. Id. art. 56.
12. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), at 71, U.N. GAOR. 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl, art I, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (establishing that all people have certain civil
and political rights, such as the right to self-determination).
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1966.14 Other human rights conventions include the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination ("CERD")15 of 1966; the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
("CEDAW") 16 of 1979; and the Convention against Torture and
17
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of
1984. The United States and France are parties to the majority of
these human rights conventions. 8 Regional inter-governmental
organizations have also adopted human rights treaties. France, for
example, is party to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the Council
of Europe in 1950.19
14. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1CESCR] (establishing that all people
have the right to determine their own political status and pursue their own
economic, social, and cultural development).
15. International Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 1, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Race
Convention] (defining the term "racial discrimination" as "any distinction,
exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin which has the purpose of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, of human rights and fundamental freedoms").
16. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women art. 2, Dec. 18, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW] (stating that
member states have an obligation to eliminate the discrimination against women
by granting constitutional equality, adopting anti-discrimination legislation, and
taking appropriate enforcement measures against any party that discriminates
against women).
17. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 5, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
CAT] (stating that member states should take necessary measures to establish
jurisdiction over torture violations when the offense occurs in its jurisdiction, when
the alleged offender is a national of a member state, or when the victim is a
national of a member state).
18. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

11

(2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (stating that France is a
party to ten out of thirteen of the major human rights convention and the United
States is a party to eight out of thirteen of the major human rights conventions).
19. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms arts. 1-20, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]
(describing the basic rights and freedoms that member states must grant any person
in their jurisdictions). The granted rights include the right to life, liberty, and
security of person. Id. art. 5. The granted freedoms include freedom from slavery
and involuntary servitude. Id. arts. 2-4.
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These international and regional human rights conventions state
that member countries bound to the U.N. Charter have the obligation
to uphold human rights law. 20 The United States and France are thus
the primary actors in ensuring the fulfillment of human rights,
although the ways in which they address these duties differ.
Nevertheless, the power held by states is declining as "the
globali[z]ation of the world economy offers unprecedented
opportunities to business. ' 21 The dramatic increase in corporations'
wealth, power, influence and responsibility over the last twenty
years 22 explains why corporations, especially transnational
corporations ("TNCs"), are increasingly expected to respect human
rights law directly.
There are three key reasons for the emergence of a direct
responsibility for corporations. First, TNCs are extremely influential
with national governments 23 and can use their influence to make
governments implement more competitive national policies, which
are often less conducive to the realization of human rights for local
communities.24 Conversely, this influence means that TNCs are "in a

20. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 998-1004 (Sir Robert Jennings
&Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (explaining how the United Nations was
unsuccessful in persuading its members to adopt the International Bill of Human
Rights Charter as of the early 1990s). In recent years, progress has been made in
the adoption and application of the Charter. Id. at 998-99.
21. PETER FRANKENTAL & FRANCES HOUSE, HUMAN RIGHTS-IS IT ANY OF
YOUR BUSINESS? 5 (2000), available at http://www.iblf.org/docs/IsItYourBusiness
.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Official Website of Global Policy Forum, Tables and Charts on
Social & Economic Policy: Comparison of Revenues Among States and TNCs
(May 10, 2000), http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/tncstat2.htm (stating
that only seven nations have greater annual incomes than General Motors). The
tables also show that several American, Asian, and European corporations have
incomes comparable to wealthy states. Id.
23. Tania Voon, Multinational Enterprises and State Sovereignty Under
International Law, 21 ADEL. L. REv. 219, 234-41 (1999) (discussing how
multinational enterprises use foreign direct investment to wield tremendous
influence over host states).
24. Daniel Aguirre, Multinational Corporations and the Realization of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53, 53-54 (2004)
(describing how corporations can use their influence to negatively impact the
development of economic, social, and cultural rights in a host nation). The
development of these rights is central to the stabilization and development of the
host nations' communities. Id.
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unique position to promote change and persuade governments to
abide by their human rights obligations. 25 Second, states are no
longer the sole violators of human rights law: TNCs can also violate
human rights. 26 Third, states increasingly contract out their functions
to private actors, which should not absolve a government of human
rights enforcement responsibilities.2 7 These factors encourage
commentators to question "whether a human rights system premised
on state responsibility to respect human rights can be effective in a
28
globalized world.
A number of trends, representing both similarities and
discrepancies, have emerged in the United States and France in
response to the search for a framework for international corporate
accountability. Part I will analyze the American and French methods
for applying human rights law to corporations. Both the United
States and France remain the primary actors to ensure respect of the
human rights potentially affected by TNC activities. However,
corporate social responsibility movements have influenced American
and French government regulation differently. Furthermore, the ways
in which the two states are held accountable for failing to ensure that
corporate activities comply with human rights standards diverge. Part
II will assess the direct application of international human rights law
to American and French companies. American and French
companies have different approaches to codes of conduct, although
25. Id. at 64; see BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 53 (explaining how
the human rights records of businesses must be closely examined). As more public
functions are privatized, there is a great risk that states can outsource their human
rights obligations to businesses that may or may not fulfill those responsibilities.
26. Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporationsand
InternationalLaw: Wherefrom Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1,7-9 (2003).
27. See Aguirre, supra note 24, at 57-64; BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note
2, at 26, 34-37, 53 (explaining that businesses can fulfill traditional state functions
such as providing security, food, health care, education, and housing); see also
Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, ECHR (1993), Series A., Vol. 247-C, 27
(noting that a state remains liable for violations of human rights, such as the right
to education, even if it has delegated authority to private entities to perform
governmental functions).
28. Julie Campagna, United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights: The International Community Asserts Binding Law on the Global
Rule Makers, 37 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 1205, 1207-14 (2004); see also Dinah
Shelton, ProtectingHuman Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 273, 274 (2002).
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both are affected by the path toward binding obligations on
corporations. In addition, these companies bear diverging risks of
lawsuits in American and French tribunals, although both states are
concerned by the emergence of the concept of corporate complicity
in human rights abuse.

I. AMERICAN AND FRENCH METHODS FOR
APPLYING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO
CORPORATIONS
A. PRIMARY ACTORS IN ENSURING COMPANIES COMPLY WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS

1. States As PrimaryActors
States are the primary actors in promoting and protecting human
rights.29 The United Nations reaffirmed this responsibility in the U.N.
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.30
As U.N. members, the United States and France therefore have the
duty to comply with international human rights standards with regard
to individuals living in these countries. They can choose to do this in
various ways, such as guaranteeing certain rights to citizens in their
national constitutions or by passing certain laws protecting their
citizens. 3
However, the ways in which the United States and France address
their international obligation of respecting human rights differ.
29. Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of InternationalHuman Rights, 6 MIN,. J. GLOBAL

153, 153 (1997) (discussing that in addition to states, the primary actors in
protecting human fights are intergovernmental organizations such as the United
Nations).
30. U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 1 (giving states the affirmative duty to be the
primary protectors and promoters of human rights).
TRADE

31. Erin Elizabeth Macek, Note, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why
Corporations Have No Incentive to Define Human Rights, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL

102 (2002) (discussing that governments have guaranteed rights to
citizens by passing anti-discrimination laws, granting asylum to refugees,
providing social assistance programs such as health and unemployment insurance,
and guaranteeing to citizens the freedom of expression).
TRADE 101,
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France is a monist country: once a human rights treaty is ratified, it is
directly applicable to domestic proceedings.32 In the United States,
however, treaties can be either self-executing or non-self-executing,
a distinction that narrows the direct application of treaties.33
Moreover, the U.S. government tends to declare human rights
conventions as non-self-executing, meaning that they have no force
of law without implementing legislation.3 4
In complying with their primary duty of protecting human rights,
France and the United States have had to alter the actors they
regulate. Increasingly, these countries are obliged to ensure
protection of their citizens' human rights from actions of private
actors-including harmful acts by corporations. Indeed, international
human rights law has traditionally "sought to protect individuals
principally against abuse of state power by public officials."3 5
However, "this distinction between public authorities and private
36
actors is breaking down.
France and the United States have a general obligation to respect,
fulfill and protect human rights, and they therefore must prevent
corporations from violating human rights.37 In addition, certain
specific provisions in treaties, explicitly or through interpretation,
require that these states regulate corporate activities.3 8
First, private actors have been deemed a necessary target of a
state's human rights regulation. For example, the U.N. committee
monitoring the ICCPR has construed some of that covenant's
provisions "as imposing obligations on states to stop or prevent
abuses by private actors."3 9 The state, for example, has the duty to

32. 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.).
33. M. Shah Alam, Enforcement of International Human Rights Law by
Domestic Courts, 10 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 28 (2004).
34. Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human
Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347, 348-49 (2000).
35. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 46.

36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law,
Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66, 102 (1993).
38. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 46.

39. Id. at 48 n. 125 ("The travaux pr~paratoire (or preparatory documents
summarizing [sic] the drafting discussions) of this treaty suggest that a majority of
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protect the right to privacy, which can be violated by "natural or
legal persons."4 Furthermore, to respect the right to life, states
parties must "take measures... to prevent and punish deprivation of
life by criminal acts,"'" which thereby includes regulating
corporations. The U.N. committee monitoring the ICESCR has also
noted that a state must regulate corporations in order to respect the
rights listed in that treaty.4 2 Finally, the Maastricht Guidelines of

1997 on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
conclude that the "obligation to protect includes the State's
responsibility to ensure that private entities or individuals, including
transnational corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction, do
not deprive individuals of their economic, social and cultural
rights. 4 3 Indeed, the Maastricht guidelines declare that "[s]tates are
responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural rights that
result from their failure to exercise due diligence in controlling the
behaviour of such non-state actors. 4 4
Second, certain conventions explicitly obligate the state to regulate
companies. The CEDAW, for example, obligates states to "take all
states saw the treaty as protecting human life against 'unwarranted actions by
public authorities as well as by private persons."').
40. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, General Comment No.
16: The Right to Respect Privacy, Family, Home, Correspondence,and Protection
of Honour and Reputation (Art. 17), (32d Sess., 1988), reprintedin Compilation of
General Observations and Recommendations Adopted by General Bodies Created
1
in Virtue Treaty on Human Rights (2004), U.N. Doc. HRJIGEN/1/Rev.7,
(asserting that every person has a right to be protected against arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his home, family, and correspondences); see also BEYOND
VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 48.
41. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, General Comment No.
6: The Right to Life (Art. 6), (16th Sess., 1982), reprinted in Compilation of
General Observations and Recommendations Adopted by General Bodies Created
in Virtue Treaty on Human Rights (2004), U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/1/Rev.7, 3; see
also BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 48.
42. U.N. Comm 'n on Econ., Social. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No.
12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), 12th Sess., 1999, reprinted in
Compilation of General Observations and Recommendations Adopted by General
Bodies Created in Virtue Treaty on Human Rights (2004), U.N.Doc.
E/C. 12/1999/5, 27 [hereinafter Comment 12] (advising that "[s]tate parties should
take appropriate steps to ensure that activities of the private business sector and
civil society are in conformity with the right to food").
43. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 20 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 691, 698 (1998).
44. Id.
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appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by
any person, organization or enterprise."4 5 This convention has been
interpreted to mean that a state must also assume responsibility for
private acts of violence against women, including those of a
company.46 Similarly, the CERD requires states to "prohibit and
bring to an end . . racial discrimination by any persons, group or
organization."4 7 The U.N. committee in charge of monitoring this
treaty stressed the importance of regulating private institutions by
stating that "to the extent that private institutions influence the
exercise of rights or the availability of opportunities, the state party
must ensure that the result has neither the purpose nor the effect of
creating or perpetuating racial discrimination. '4 8 The Convention on
the Rights of the Child also includes a duty for states to regulate
private institutions that care for children.4 9
Finally, regional courts have confirmed that states must ensure that
companies adhere to human rights. The European Court of Human
Rights ("ECHR") found, for example, that Italy failed to inform
citizens of the risks posed by a corporation-a chemical factoryand in failing to do so, violated their right to respect for private and
family life.50
France, the United States, and other states must assume
responsibility for regulating corporate compliance with human rights
45. See CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 2(e).
46. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Woman, (11 th Sess., 1992),
U.N. Doc. A/47/38,
9 (recommending that states interpret CEDAW as giving

states responsibility for private acts of violence against women).
47. See Race Convention, supra note 15, art. 2(l)(d).
48.

OFFICE

OF

COMMENT No.

THE

20:

U.N.

HIGH

COMM'R

NON-DISCRIMINATORY

FOR

HUMAN

IMPLEMENTATION

RIGHTS,

GENERAL

OF RIGHTS AND

5), (48TH SESS., 1996), REPRINTED IN COMPILATION OF GENERAL
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY GENERAL BODIES CREATED
FREEDOMS (ART.

(2004), U.N. DOC. HRUGEN/I/REv.7, 5.
49. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, arts. 3, 19,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989)
[hereinafter Rights of the Child] (giving states the affirmative duty to compel
private child care providers to protect children by implementing laws and
regulations that ensure child safety).
50. See European Court of Human Rights, Guerra v. Italy, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, No. 64 (19 Feb. 1998), 58 (asserting that states
not only have the responsibility to abstain from interference with the rights of
private or family life, but also have an affirmative duty to prevent such violations).
IN VIRTUE TREATY ON HUMAN RIGHTS

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[23:855

within their respective borders. Professors Orentlicher and Gelatt
explain that state responsibility for the protection of human rights
ensures adequate protection and respects national sovereignty.5 '
Regulating TNCs activities in a foreign country, in contrast, is a duty
..
that belongs to the host state.
The United States and France can usually only affect the
fulfillment of human rights for individuals living in other states by
pressuring these other states to comply with human rights.52 The
United States, for example, has "used human rights practices as a
basic indicator of [its] willingness to maintain political, economic
and cultural relations with other nations."53 Nevertheless, it can be
problematic to expect countries where American and French TNCs
operate to regulate the TNCs' activities. Some countries are less
likely to ensure that TNCs within their territory adhere to human
rights principles as they themselves do not have a good human rights
record.54 Moreover, "[i]ntense competition among developing
countries for foreign investment,' combined with multinational
corporations' search for countries that offer them the lowest
costs... operate as powerful disincentives for underdeveloped
countries to impose stringent requirements on foreign investors."55
The United States and France can, therefore, choose to regulate
their companies' overseas operations to ensure their adherence to
international human rights. 6 Indeed, extraterritorial regulation has

51. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 37, at 103.
52. Frey, supra note 29, at 155-56 (arguing that states often use various aspects
of bilateral diplomacy in order to pressure other states to improve their human
rights records).
53. See id. (pointing out that the United States prohibits economic aid to
countries engaged in consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally
recognized rights).
54. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Dep't,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2004 (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004 (detailing human rights experiences in
countries around the world).
55. Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 37, at 103; see also Jacqueline DuvalMajor, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650, 674-75
(1992) (noting that multinational corporations often seek out investment
opportunities in developing states that do not significantly regulate business).
56. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 37, at 103-04 (arguing that
governments of developed states should be responsible for regulating domestically
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emerged as "an inevitable concomitant of, and appropriate response
to, the growing influence of non-state actors in countries other than
their national state."5 7 In the United States, the nationality principle,"
which applies to juridical as well as natural persons,5 9 enables it to
regulate corporations' activities abroad. The U.S. Congress has used
this principle to enact laws regulating the overseas conduct of U.S.
corporations, such as to prohibit these companies from complying
with the Arab boycott of Israel and engaging in corrupt practices.60
As for France, international mandatory rules called "Lois de police"
enable the application of French law to corporate activities abroad.6'
Indeed, these laws are considered so important for the country that
their extraterritorial application is necessary. 6 Therefore, France and
the United States are primary actors in ensuring that companies
within their boundaries and abroad comply with international human
rights law.
2. Human Rights Affected by Business Activity
International human rights norms that a state shall respect, fulfill,
and protect are those agreed upon by the international community in

based corporations to ensure compliance with international human right norms
given the hesitance of some developing countries to regulate multinational
corporations).
57. Id. at 105.
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.
§ 402(2) (1987) (stating that that "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well
as within its territory").
59. See id. § 402 cmt. (e) (specifying that "the nationality of a corporation ...
is that of the state under whose law it is organized").
60. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
980-1001 (2d ed. 1987).
61. See Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-374/96, Arblade v. Leloup, E.C.R. I8453, 30 (using "public order legislation" to refer to French equivalent of "lois
de police" and defining them as "national provisions compliance with which has
been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic
order in the Member State concemed as to require compliance therewith by all
persons present on the national territory of that Member State'and all legal
relationships within that State").
62. See

PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

tbd (7th ed. 2002). Examples of "Loi de police" include certain laws concerning
workers and consumers, which therefore apply to corporate activities abroad.

AM. U INT'L L. REV.

[23:855

the UDHR and subsequent treaties. 63 Therefore, France and the
United States, as members of the international community and as
parties to many of these treaties, must respect the same international
human rights, even if their methods of compliance differ. The U.N.
Global Compact and U.N. Norms, although non-binding documents,
provide guidance as to which rights states should target when
regulating corporate activities.' Both documents assert the need to
respect human rights in general and enumerate particular human
65
rights upon which corporate activity should focus.
First, the treaties require France and the United States to regulate
workers' rights.66 International human rights agreements target four
particular labor rights: freedom of association and the right to
68
collective bargaining;67 the abolition of forced or compulsory labor;

63. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
982-83 (2d ed. 1987) (detailing the various sources of human rights in international
law).
64. See Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations, TransnationalLaw:
The United Nations' Norms on the Responsibilitiesof TransnationalCorporations
as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 356 (2006) (arguing that the U.N. Norms greatest
strength is its creation of a framework for states to follow when regulating
transnational corporations). See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 20-43,
for a detailed discussion on the human rights guaranteed by international law.
65. See Official Website of U.N. Global Compact, About the Global Compact:
The Ten Principles, Principles 1-2, http://ww.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC
/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Global
Compact] (asking companies to "support and respect the protection of
internationally proclaimed human rights" and ensure "they are not complicit in
human rights abuses"); see also U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 1 (placing a general
obligation on transnational companies "to promote, secure the fulfillment of,
respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as
well as national law"). The Norms then focus on specific rights by obligating
transnational corporations "to respect economic, social and cultural rights as well
as civil and political rights and contribute to their realization." Id. 12.
66. See Global Compact, supra note 65 (placing emphasis on labor rights by
devoting more sections to labor standards than any other area); U.N. Norms, supra
note 1, 77 5-9 (devoting one out of six sections to labor rights).
67. See Global Compact, supra note 65, Principle 3 (noting that constructive
dialogue achieved through the guarantees of freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining will help workers and employers understand each other's
points of view); see also U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 9 (requiring transnational
corporations to recognize freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining of their workers); UDHR, supra note 12, arts. 20, 23(4) (granting the
rights of freedom of association and membership in trade unions to everyone);
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the abolition of child labor; 69 and the elimination of discrimination in
employment and occupation. 0 The International Labor Organization

ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 8(1) (calling upon state parties to recognize their
citizens' right to join trade unions, subject only to national security interests or
necessities of public order and protection of the rights of others); ICCPR, supra
note 13, arts. 21, 22 (obligating state parties to recognize the rights of peaceful
assembly and freedom of association, which includes the right "to form and join
trade unions"). See generally Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise (No. 87), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17,
reprinted in International Labour Organisation, International Labour Conventions
and Recommendations: 1919-1951, at 527 (1996) (outlining general principles
governing workers' freedom of association and right to organize); Convention on
the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively (No. 98), July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S.
257, reprinted in International Labour Organisation, International Labour
Conventions and Recommendations: 1919-1951, at 639 (1996) (specifying steps
member states should take to ensure effective implementation of workers' right to
organize).
68. See Global Compact, supra note 65, Principle 4 (prohibiting businesses
from using compulsory labor in their operations); see also U.N. Norms, supra note
i,
5 (forbidding transnational corporations from the use of forced and
compulsory labor as stipulated in relevant international and national laws); UDHR,
supra note 12, art. 4 (prohibiting slavery and servitude and banning slave trade);
ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 8 (prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude and
limiting use of compulsory labor to compliance with court order, military service,
emergency situations, and normal civil obligations); Convention Concerning
Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29), June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, reprinted
in International Labour Organisation, International Labour Conventions and
Recommendations: 1919-1951, at 143 (1996) (requiring states to suppress any use
of compulsory labor); Convention Concerning Abolition of Forced Labour (No.
105), June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291, 294-95, reprinted in International Labour
Organisation, International Labour Conventions and Recommendations: 19521976, at 88-89 (1996) (specifying that economic development is among the
prohibited purposes of forced or compulsory labor).
69. See Global Compact, supra note 65, Principle 5 (calling upon businesses to
abolish child labor); U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 6 (urging businesses to "respect
the rights of children to be protected from economic exploitation"); see also
ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 10(3) (requesting states to protect children from
economic exploitation); Rights of the Child, supra note 49, art. 32 (directing states
to enact legislation establishing the minimum age of employment, hours and work
conditions, as well as penalties for violation of child protection laws).
70. See Global Compact, supra note 65, Principle 6 (defining discrimination in
employment and occupation and providing strategies that businesses could employ
in order to eliminate such discrimination); U.N. Norms, supra note 1,
2
(obligating businesses to uphold "equality of opportunity and treatment" of
individuals, excepting only "children, who may be given greater protection"); see
also UDHR, supra note 12, art. 23(2) (declaring a universal right to "equal pay for
equal work"); ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 7 (declaring that states parties to the
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("ILO") Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
affirms the importance of these rights, stating that all ILO members,
including the United States and France, are bound by these standards,
regardless of whether they have ratified the conventions. 7 ' The U.N.
Norms and the human rights conventions also guarantee additional
rights, such as the right to a safe and healthy working environment"

and the worker's right to a "remuneration that ensures an adequate
standard of living for them and their families."73 Business has a
profound impact on all of these rights. According to the International
Council on Human Rights, "most multinational corporations refuse
formally to support freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining in their codes of conduct."74 This can, in turn, have an
impact on the protection of other rights because employees cannot
defend their rights.7 5
France and the United States need to pay particular attention to the

principle of non-discrimination as it applies to workers, consumers,

convention recognize "just and favorable conditions of work" that include equality
in pay and promotional opportunities).
71. See International Labor Organization [ILO], Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, International Labour Conference, 86th Sess., June
19, 1998, 2, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237 (declaring that members are bound by ILO's
conventions by virtue of their membership in ILO).
72. See U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 7 (calling upon businesses to provide "a
safe and healthy working environment" in accordance with international
standards); see also UDHR, supra note 12, art. 23 (proclaiming a right to "just and
favorable conditions of work"); ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 7(2) (requiring States
to enforce people's right to "safe and healthy work conditions"). See generally
Convention on Occupational Safety and Health Convention pmbl., June 22, 1981,
1331 U.N.T.S. 279 (establishing principles and guidelines for labor rights
enforcement actions on national and organizational levels).
73. See U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 8 (requiring corporations to provide
adequate compensation to their workers for the work they have performed); see
also UDHR, supra note 12, arts. 23, 25 (declaring a fundamental right to just
compensation and to adequate standards of living); ICESCR, supra note 14, art.
7(1) (charging states with enforcing the right to fair wage and living standards).
74. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 30 (citing Kathryn Gordon
& Maiko Miyake, Deciphering Codes of Corporate Conduct 14, 15 (Organisation
for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD] Directorate for Fin., Fiscal
& Enter. Affairs, Working Paper on International Investment No. 1999/2, 2000)).
75. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 30 (arguing that without
unions, workers cannot as effectively assert their rights).
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and even communities affected by corporate activity.7 6 In particular,

international guidelines prohibit discrimination against women by
corporations, which is consistent with human rights treaties," and
also prohibit discrimination in the field of employment.7
The U.N. Norms also state that corporations "shall respect ...
civil and political rights" and give examples of the most relevant
rights, such as "freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and
freedom of opinion and expression."79 Another civil right potentially
affected by corporate activity is the freedom from "arbitrary
interference with [an individual's] privacy, family, home or
correspondence."80 These civil and political rights could be infringed
upon by corporate activity and therefore require particular scrutiny
by both France and the United States.
The U.N. Norms state further that a company "shall respect
economic, social and cultural rights . . . and contribute to their

realization, in particular the rights to development, adequate food
and drinking water, the highest attainable standard of physical and

76. See id. at 23-24; see also ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 2(1), 26 (declaring
that discrimination is prohibited on the grounds of "race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status"); UDHR, supra note 12, art. 2 (stating that discrimination is prohibited on
the grounds of "marital status, nationality, ethnic origin and economic position").
77. See UDHR, supra note 12, art. 2; see also ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 2, 3
& 26; ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 2; CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 1.
78. See, e.g., Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation art. 5, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1952-1976, at 176 (1996); Convention Concerning

Equal Renumeration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (No.

100), June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303, reprinted in

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR

supra at 653; see also CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 11; ICESCR,
supra note 15, art. 7 (calling specifically for "fair wages and equal remuneration
for work of equal value").
79. See U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 12; ICCPR, supra note 14, arts. 18, 19
(establishing freedom of expression subject to prohibition by Article 20
regarding hate speech); UDHR, supra note 13, arts. 18, 19. See generally
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR,
36th Sess., 73d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981)
(reinforcing the protections afforded in UDHR and ICCPR regarding freedom
of religion).
80. See UDHR, supra note 12, art. 12; ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17.
ORGANISATION,
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mental health, adequate housing, privacy, [and] education. . . ."I' All
of these rights are protected by various human rights conventions.8 2
These rights are generally seen as unrelated to business, but their
close relationship to corporate activity is increasingly recognized. 3
TNC operations can have a negative impact on the realization of
economic, social, and cultural rights ("ESCR") and conversely,
TNCs "are in a unique position to promote.., a foundation of social,
economic and cultural rights."8 4 Governments have a duty to act,
rather than refrain from acting, in order to ensure these rights to
individuals.8 5 Professor Alston argues that states should "search for
methods of regulating [TNC] operations so as to benefit local
communities... as well as the international economic system."86 For
example, under the ICESCR's right to food, states must ensure that
companies produce food that is "free from adverse substances,"

available, and economically and physically accessible.

Under the

ICESCR's right to health, states are required to not only ensure that
companies do not sell "contaminat[ed] foodstuffs," but also to "avoid

or destroy naturally occurring toxins."88
In addition, the U.N. Norms provide that companies "shall not
engage in nor benefit from war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, torture, forced disappearance, forced or compulsory labor,
hostage-taking, [or] extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
81. See U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 12.
82. See ICESCR, supra note 14, arts. 11-13 (calling for protection of adequate
food, clothing, housing, "the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health," and education); UDHR, supra note 12, arts. 25-26.
83. See Aguirre, supra note 24, at 54, 61-63 (citing the example of Shell in
Nigeria and affirming that the violations of ESCR led to violations of political and
civil rights); see also U.N. Norms, supra note 1,
12 (recognizing the close
relationship between the activities of TNCs and ESCR by protecting both ECSR
and civil and political rights on the same footing).
84. See Aguirre, supra note 24, at 63 (asserting that the consequences of
instability and political turmoil can be problematic for the TNCs' local business
operations).
85. See Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
365, 378-81 (1990) (discussing the controversy over the obligation clauses in the
ICESCR and their potential conflicts with the U.S. Constitution).
86. See Aguirre, supra note 24, at 66.
87. See Comment 12, supra note 42, TT 10, 12, 13 (defining the terms "free
from adverse substances", "availability" and "accessibility").
88. See id. 10; U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 13.
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Various conventions also prohibit these acts. 9 These rights
can be affected when state or private security forces are employed by
TNCs operating abroad. 9'
.... "89

Furthermore, the U.N. Global Compact emphasizes the importance
of overseeing the impact of corporate activities on the environment.
Principles 7 through 9 state: "Businesses should support a
precautionary approach to environmental challenges"; "undertake
initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility"; and
"encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally
friendly technologies." 92 The U.N. Norms also recognize obligations
for TNCs relating to environment preservation. 93 The "right to a
healthy and sustainable environment" is a third-generation right,
derived from the UDHR 94 and is increasingly recognized by
international declarations and texts. 95 Therefore, France and the
United States have an emerging duty to control corporations'
environmentally harmful activities. Even when a specific convention
has not recognized the right to a healthy and sustainable
environment, human rights bodies have inferred this right from other
89. See U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 3.
90. See ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 6-8, 10 (prohibiting arbitrary killing;
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery;
and violations against humanity and dignity with respect to detainees); UDHR,
supra note 12, arts. 3-5 (noting many of the enumerated prohibitions in Articles 68 of the ICCPR). See generally CAT, supra note 17, pmbl.
91. See FRANKENTAL & HOUSE, supra note 21, at 13 (making various
recommendations regarding the provisions in security agreements between
companies and the state entities in order to ensure the protection of human rights).
92. See Global Compact, supra note 65, Principles 7-9.
93. See U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 14.
94. See generally UDHR, supra note 12, art. 28 (proclaiming that "everyone is
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights set forth in this
Declaration can be fully realized"). This has served as a basis for what scholars
have named "Third Generation Rights," including the right to political, economic,
social, and cultural self-determination; the right to economic and social
development; the right to participate in and benefit from "the common heritage of
mankind"; the right to peace; the right to a healthy and sustainable environment;
and the right to humanitarian disaster relief. See id. arts. 1-30.
95. See generally U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights art. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2001/35 (Nov. 17, 1988);
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Report of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 1,Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
48/14 Rev.l, reprintedin 11 I.L.M. 1420 (1972).
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protected rights, such as the right to privacy and family life.96 Some
commentators argue that this is one of the most important rights to be
regulated given the extremely negative impact TNCs can have on the
environment, especially when authoritarian regimes control host
countries.9 7

Both France and the United States benefit from clear guidance by
the international community of which human rights are to be
specifically targeted when regulating corporate activity. In practice,
however, it can be difficult for the state to assert the contents of
certain rights and therefore protect them. The right to a living wage,
for example, is one such right, where the importance of the right in
corporate activity is recognized, but the definition of an acceptable
minimum wage level is debatable. 98
B. DIVERGING METHODS OF ENSURING COMPANY COMPLIANCE
WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Regulation of CorporateActivities
States usually fulfill their human rights obligations by
promulgating laws requiring companies to respect specific standards.
Despite differences concerning the incorporation of international
human rights standards into domestic law in the United States and
France, both states have domestic laws prohibiting gross violations
of human rights by companies. For example, both countries prohibit

96. See, e.g., Press Release, Chamber Judgment in the Case of Hatton v. United
Kingdom,
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Press/2OO1/Oct/Hattonjudepress.htm
(recounting the ECHR's opinion that the UK government was responsible for not
taking "reasonable and appropriate measures" to stop airplane company activities

from producing night-time noise under the right to privacy and family life).
97. See, e.g., Aaron Sachs, What do Human Rights Have to Do With
Environmental Protection? Everything., SIERRA, Nov.-Dec. 1997, http://global

leamingnj.org/global-ata/HumanRights-and EnvironmentalProtection.htm (last
visited Apr. 9, 2008).
98. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 30-31 (discussing the debate
surrounding the right to a "living wage"); see also U.S. Dep't of Labor,
International Labor Standards, http://www.dol-union-reports.gov/ilab/webmils
/intllaborstandards/workingconditions.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (asking that
some mechanism for establishing minimum wages be established in each
respective country, as no general international consensus currently exists).
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slavery and torture of their workers. 99 In addition, both countries
regulate companies through different areas of law that involve
human rights. 0 For example, environmental law can ensure that
companies respect the environment; consumer protection laws can
ensure that consumers are given protections with regard to products
purchased from companies; corporate law can require companies to
abide by certain standards or disclose information to investors
concerning their corporate operations abroad.' 01
Corporate social responsibility ("CSR") movements have
profoundly influenced American and French domestic regulation.
These movements, however, have had markedly distinct impacts in
America and France, reflecting the cultural differences between these
two countries.
The first CSR movement that took place in the 1970s had a
profound influence on American corporate regulation, whereas its
imprint on French regulation is virtually invisible. This movement
was driven by the idea that "to solve the ills of society-thought in
large part to be the product of corporate behavior.. .- some sort of
government intervention was necessary to make large corporations
and their managers again accountable."'0 2 This movement therefore
focused on governmental intervention into corporate activity and
resulted in many proposals of reform' 0 3 and major changes to U.S.

99. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); U.S.
amends. XIII, XIV.
100. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 77 (stating that most countries
use existing or new instruments, that are not considered human rights legislation,
in order to enforce observance of human rights by companies). See generally
James A. Fanto, The Role of CorporateLaw in French CorporateGovernance, 31
CONST.

CORNELL INT'L L.J. 31, 36-47 (1998) (discussing the French corporate governance
system); Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455,

1460-64 (1985) (discussing the development of the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act).
101. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 77.
102. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL.

L. REV. 1207, 1211 (2002) (stating that such accountability should be "if not to the
owners of such corporations, then to the society as a whole").
103. See id. at 1212-15 (discussing several of the proposals for corporate law
reform, such as giving individual shareholders more power, having public interest
directors, or coupling corporate social accounting with SEC-required "social-audit
results").
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policies.' 4 Much of this regulation had an impact on the promotion
of human rights within companies, in particular concerning
environmental rights. 0 5 In France, traditionally a more
interventionist country, government regulation of companies had
always been more prominent and was not particularly influenced by
06
this first CSR movement.
The second CSR movement that has gained momentum since the
late 1990s has had an impact on both France and the United States,
although the specific human rights addressed and the impact in
question varies. 107 This CSR movement has focused increasingly on
the enforcement of human rights standards in corporations.
According to one author, "business and human rights has emerged as
a distinct field within the broader corporate citizenship or corporate
social responsibility movement."'' 0 Another commentator notes that
104. Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, The CorporateAccountability Movement:

Lessons and Opportunities,23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 151, 152 (1999).
105. See, e.g., National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000)
(identifying the encouragement of "productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment" as one of the congressional purposes of the Act);
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67 (2004) ("The
1970s were an extraordinary decade for environmental law. Prior to 1970,
environmental protection was evident in only a handful of fledgling regulatory
efforts scattered across offices in the federal government and a relatively few state
governments .... Within just a few years in the 1970s, the federal government
brought together and dramatically expanded many of these programs in an effort to
forge a comprehensive legal regime for environmental protection.").
106. See Offical Website of The European Monitoring Centre on Change,
Corporate Social Responsibility in France, Germany, Hungary and the United
Kingdom (2003), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/content/source/eu03002a
.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (stating that "the overall picture in France is one
of moderate development of CSR due to the presence of a system of state
regulations and agreements governing labour relations").
107. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "'Reform" and the New
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 628-32 (2001) (stating
that the first CSR movement ended with the "law and economics" and
contractarian movements). Another CSR movement emerged in the 1990s with the
"good corporate governance" movement and institutional investor activism. Id.
These movements treated the corporation as the private contractual arrangements
of its statutory constituents-stockholders, directors, and officers governed largely
by market forces. Id.
108. See Anthony P. Ewing, Understandingthe Global Compact Human Rights
Principles, in EMBEDDING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO BUSINESS PRACTICE 28, 28-29
(2003), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issuesdoc/human
_rights/embedding.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) (pointing to globalization trends
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[t]he core of CSR concerns compliance with internationally proclaimed
human rights, such as the right to life and physical integrity and respect
for basic labor standards including the prohibition on the use of child
workers or other forms of forced labor. At the outer edge of this core,
toward the environment and
CSR encourages responsibility of businesses
09
the communities in which they operate. 1

The business standards advocated by the CSR movement therefore
overlap with international human rights standards.
Although this second CSR movement has had an impact on both
France and the United States, the human rights targeted vary
considerably. CSR in France aims at "integrat[ing] social and
environmental concerns" into business operations.I 10 However, in the
United States, CSR has a larger scope and is aimed at enhancing
"business decision-making linked to ethical values ... and respect
for people, communities and the environment" around the world."'
One scholar describes this difference by the observing that in
Europe, "CSR has focused on the environmental and social impact of
companies' business functions," whereas in the United States, CSR
"involves donations to social and artistic causes and other such acts
of corporate philanthropy."" 2
Moreover, this CSR movement has had a diverging impact on
France and America. This second CSR movement no longer places
its emphasis on government regulation, but instead promotes

in the areas of human rights, trade and investment, and communications as the
source of pressure on companies to consider human rights issues).
109. Pall A. Davidsson, Note, Legal Enforcement of Corporate Social
Responsibility Within the EU,8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 529, 550 (2002).
A EUROPEAN
110. EUROPEAN COMM'N, GREEN PAPER, PROMOTING
FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 8 (2001), available at

http://ec.europa.eu/employment-social/soc-dial/csr/greenpaper-en.pdf [hereinafter
GREEN PAPER] (noting that CSR should not be a substitute for proper state
regulation or legislation regarding the protection of the social rights and the
environment).
111. Yale Global Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1339 (last
visited May 15, 2008) (quoting Business for Social Responsibility's definition).
112. See Abid Aslam, Backgrounder: Corporate Social Responsibility,
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/j-corporatesocial.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2008) (referring to CSR as "a balancing act between the interests of a company's
'stakeholders' including shareholders, executives, employees, communities, and
customers").
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voluntary initiatives undertaken by companies." 3 In the United
States, this movement has resulted in an explosion since the late
1990s of voluntary corporate initiatives undertaken by companies
themselves. The fact that there has been increased government
regulation of corporate disclosure in the United States is not,
however, a direct result of this second CSR movement, but instead
has stemmed from the need to protect American investors in the
wake of financial scandals.'l 4 In France, this CSR movement has, on
the contrary, resulted directly in increased regulation of French
companies without an increase in voluntary corporate initiatives.
Subsequent to the European Union Green Paper on CSR,"1 5 France
passed a law which mandated the disclosure of social,
environmental, and profit performance.' 6 This law applies to all
French companies listed on the French Stock Exchange and therefore
to TNCs as well." 7 French companies now have the obligation to
describe to all stakeholders the social and environmental
consequences of their activities in their annual reports." 8 However,
the companies have no further obligation to act upon these
consequences." 19
In promoting the protection of the environment and the well-being
of employees, the community, and civil society in general,2 0 the
113. See Branson, supra note 102, at 1225 (offering the view that the new CSR
movement is only a part of the movement to create good corporate governance);
GREEN PAPER,

supra note 110, at 8.

114. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006). The disclosure
required in Sarbanes-Oxley has influenced the requirements applicable to public
companies. For example, Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a public
company to disclose whether it has adopted a code of ethics for its senior financial
officers, and if not, the reasons why not. Id. § 406.

115. GREEN PAPER, supra note 110.
116. Law No. 2001-420 of May 15, 2001, Journal Officiel de la R~publique
Franiaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 16, 2001, p. 7776.
117. See id. (providing an exception for companies that are not listed on an
exchange).
118. See generally Novethic.fr, Le Dispositif de la Loi NRE Sur le Reporting
Societal des Entreprises [The Perspective of the NRE Law on the Social
Responsibility Reporting of Companies], http://www.novethic.fr/novethic/site
/article/imprimer.jsp?id=74593 (last visited Apr. 11, 2008) (describing the decree
of February 20, 2002, which provides a rubric for such disclosures).
119. Id.
120. See Official Website of Business and Sustainable Development, Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR), http://www.bsdglobal.com/issues/sr.asp (last visited
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CSR movement therefore furthers certain human rights standards in
American and French businesses, although its impact on compulsory
measures varies between France and the United States.
2. Holding the State Accountablefor CorporateHuman Rights
Violations
States "are increasingly held to be in breach of their human rights
obligations when they fail to prevent abuses by private actors."2'
Criteria are therefore gradually being determined to measure this
liability.' A state can be liable for supporting or acquiescing to a
private actor's commission of a human rights violation.'23 This
scenario is rare, however, and it is improbable that France or the
United States would be held liable under this standard. Additionally,
a state will be responsible for not taking "reasonable or serious steps
to prevent or respond to an abuse by a private actor."' 24 This due
diligence test was first stated by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights'25 and has subsequently been applied by human rights bodies
126
worldwide to the actions of states.
Plaintiffs can complain about the failure of France or the United
States to comply with their human rights obligations in their
domestic tribunals. A country's domestic courts are viewed as more

Mar. 27, 2008) (asserting that the traditional role of corporations solely as profitmaking entitities is being increasingly swept away in favor of corporate social
responsibility); see also Branson, supra note 102, at 1225 (stating that this new
CSR movement has advocated for corporations to become more transparent, to
respect the environment, and to account for the social consequences of their
actions).
121. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 53.
122. Id. at 51-52
123. Id. at 52.
124. Id.
125. See Velhsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, 172 (July 29, 1988) (stating that an "illegal act which violates human
rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State .

.

. can lead to

international responsibility of the State ... because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violations or to respond to it as required by the Convention").
126. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104, art. 4(c), U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) (calling upon states to exerecise due diligence
regarding violence against women).
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convenient forums for individuals to seek relief 27 and their use can
be required before international proceedings.' 28 Nevertheless, their
use in France and the United States differs. In France, individuals
have the right to recourse in domestic courts for infringement of
rights guaranteed under the ECHR. 129 Moreover, the French court's
power to use international human rights law has been greatly
influenced by the European context, in which European law applies
directly to French judges. 30 In the United States, however, domestic
enforcement of international human rights law is not as developed.'
There is a narrow constitutional scope for direct application of
treaties, and U.S. courts have tended not to construct customary
international law from universal state practices.'32
If the use of a domestic court does not yield results, individuals
can complain about the failure of France or the United States to
comply with a human rights treaty in an international arena. Again,
France is more readily liable in the international arena, due in part to
the increased number of jurisdictions open to French citizens.
First, the U.N. Human Rights Council, charged with monitoring
the ICCPR, can "receive and consider communications from
individuals.., who claim to be victims of a violation by that state
party of any of the rights set forth in the covenant."' 33 France ratified
the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which enabled this

127. See Alam, supra note 33, at 1 (arguing that there is no effective
international mechanism for the enforcement of international law).
128. See ECHR, supra note 19, art. 35 ("The Court may only deal with the
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted.").
129. Id.
130. See Alam, supra note 33, at 5 ("The courts in the countries of Europe enjoy
wide power and jurisdiction to apply international law, whether treaty or
customary. Application of general international law by the national courts in
Europe has been influenced by the application of the European community law by
these countries. The decisions of the European Commission, the European Court of
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have greatly influenced the
jurisprudence ofjudicial decisions of the member-states.").
131. Id. at3-4.
132. Id.
133. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, at 59, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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procedure in 1984; the United States is not party to this protocol. 3 4
Therefore, French citizens can benefit from lodging complaints with
the Human Rights Council whereas American citizens cannot.
France, for example, was held responsible for its role in a
development project, carried out in partnership with a private
company, which violated a tribal community's right to family and
privacy.'3 5 The U.N. committee monitoring the ICESCR cannot
receive individual complaints from individuals, although it can raise
issues when examining country reports. 3 6 This committee's
jurisdiction applies to France, but not the United States as the latter
did not ratify the ICESCR. 13 7
Second, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the main
political body of the U.N. that dealt with human rights, could receive
individual complaints-known as the 1503 procedure-about a
"consistent pattern of gross violations" by a state which had been
"reliably attested."'' 38 Resolutions from the Commission refer to state
139
responsibilities in relation to human rights abuses by businesses.

134. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org
/english/bodies/ratification/5.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) (updating the recent
status of the ratification of the First Optional Protocol).
135. See Hopu v. France, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 60th Sess.,
Communications No. 549/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1 (Dec.
29, 1997) (finding France in violation of Articles 17 and 23 of the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
136. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights
Bodies: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www2.ohchr
.org/english/bodies/cescr/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) (noting that the
United Nations is moving forward on an additional optional protocol that would
give the Committee cognizance over individual complaints).
137. See ICESCR, supra note 15, at 4 (showing that the United States was not
among the countries that ratified the ICESCR).
138. See Official Website of FrontlineDefenders,
1503 Procedures,
http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/book/export/html/833 (last visited Feb. 10,
2008).
139. See Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2001/35,
5, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2001/35 (Apr. 20, 2001) (calling on governments to attend to their
international obligations in order to prevent waste dumping in their territory); see
also Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2001/33,
2, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2001/33 (Apr. 20, 2001) (urging states to act by treating those
suffering from HIV/AIDS); ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the
Right to Food, 57th Sess.,
73, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/53 (Feb. 7, 2001)
(preparedby Jean Ziegler, Special Rapporteur) (warning that some patents held by
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The Human Rights Council, which replaced the U.N. Commission on

Human Rights in 2006,14° is establishing a new complaint procedure
to build on and improve this 1503 procedure.' 4 1 This procedure can
be used by individuals complaining against France or the United
States for a company's human rights violation, although
commentators note the limitations of this procedure for violations of
an individual's rights.

142

Third, the committees of independent experts within the United
Nations charged with monitoring a state's implementation of the
conventions concerning racial discrimination, torture, and women's
rights can receive complaints from victims concerning abuses by
their state. Subject to certain conditions, these committees can hold
France and the United States liable under this procedure. If the
victims' rights are found to have been violated, they can receive
compensation or other remedies, including interim measures to
prevent damage that cannot be undone. 143 Additionally, the
committees against torture and for the elimination of discrimination

against women "can investigate systematic violations by a state of
the rights they oversee."""4
multinational corporations greatly harm farmers in certain countries). In addition,
the U.N. Commission approved the Draft U.N. Norms on the responsibilities of
transnational corporations.
140. G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. AJRES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006) (establishing
the Human Rights Council which replaced the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights).
141. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Complaint
Procedure, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/complaints.htm (stating that
this new complaint procedure "is established in compliance with the mandate
entrusted to the Human Rights Council by General Assembly resolution 60/251 of
15 March 2006, in which the Council was requested to review and, where
necessary, improve and rationalize, within one year after the holding of its first
session, all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of the former
Commission on Human Rights, including the 1503 procedure, in order to maintain
a system of special procedures, expert advice and a complaint procedure").
142. See, e.g., Stop Violence Against Women, The 1503 Procedure,
http://www.stopvaw.org/The 1503_Procedure_.html (stating that the "procedure
[is] useful if a victim wants the UN to investigate the situation in her country, but
not her particular case").
143. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 84 (highlighting the
importance of these interim measures as "[m]any years may pass after the abuse
before a judgment is given").
144. Id. at 85 (noting that an investigation can be asked for by "any person or
organization, including NGOs, . . . [so long as] their source of information is
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Fourth, the International Labor Organization ("ILO") has looked
more closely at the "impact of trade on labour rights" since "the
decision by trade ministers to keep labour rights issues out of the
[World Trade Organization]."' 45 France and the United States report
to a Committee of Experts on how they have implemented ILO
standards and these reports can be used to investigate how they are
domestically enforcing ILO standards in relation to companies.
Additionally, member states, employers, or employees can lodge a
formal complaint with the ILO claiming that another state is
violating a convention, which will be investigated by a quasi-judicial
Commission of Inquiry.' 46
Apart from U.N. auspices, France can additionally be held
accountable by the European Court of Human Rights. 4 ' Individuals
may therefore complain about the violation of civil and political
rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human
Rights.'48 These civil and political rights are complemented by the
European Social Charter, although rights guaranteed in the Charter
are not subject to individual complaints. 4 9 Nevertheless, France
reports on how it has implemented the Charter which can be
followed by recommendations from the Committee of Ministers of

'reliable.' Investigation is confidential and occurs only in severe cases. In some
circumstances the conclusions can be made public").
145. Id. at 89 (arguing that the WTO and the ILO should forge a formal
relationship, but also noting that this has not been well received by either
organization).
146. See id. at 90-91; see also Press Release, International Labor Organization,
ILO Governing Body Opens Way for Unprecedented Action Against Forced Labor
in Myanmar (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/global/lang-en/index.htm (follow "About the ILO"; click "Media and Public Information: Press
Releases") (reporting that international organizations were asked to suspend
relations with Myanmar because they could be seen as aiding Myanmar's forced
labor policies in violation of several human rights conventions).
147. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights arts. 4-5, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
148. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (giving the European Court of
Human Rights jurisdiction over individual complaints charging a state party with a
violation of the Convention).
149. See European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (granting the
right to work, to organize, to collective bargaining, and to training).
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the Council of Europe. 5 ' Moreover, France allows "international and
national employer and trade union organi[z]ations, and NGOs which
have consultative status with the Council of Europe [to] lodge
collective complaints about a state's failure to comply with the
Social Charter,"'' which can result in recommendations from the
53
52
European Committee of Social Rights against France.
Agreements that do not qualify as human rights agreements may
also have a profound impact on individual complaints, particularly in
the United States. The United States is party to the 1992 North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), 154 which aims to
promote free trade, but also seeks sustainable development, stronger
environmental laws, and enhancement of workers rights."' Private
parties may lodge complaints of an environmental nature with the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation and the Commission
150. Marie Guiraud Nicolas Legoff, La Charte sociale europ~enne et son
Protocole: un modle dtsuivre ? [The European Social Charter and Its Protocol:
A Model to Be Followed?], available at http://www.fidh.org/article.php3
?idarticle=408.
151. See ECSR R. P. 20 (European Comm. of Social Rights 1999) (stating that
the complainant must establish his or her standing by showing that he or she
represents the interests of the group whose rights are allegedly violated); see also
Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of
Collective Complaints art. 9, Nov. 9, 1995, Europ. T.S. 158 (requiring a two-thirds
vote of the Committee of Ministers in order to make a recommendation to a state
party). These collective complaints have particularly concerned states' work
practices and some have even dealt with the alleged failure of a state to adequately
monitor labor conditions in private companies. See Legoff, supra note 150 (stating
that France among other countries has ratified the Additional Protocol to the
European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints).
152. See European Committee of Social Rights, Council of Europe,
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human rights/esc/2_ECSREuropeanCommittee of Socia
1_Rights/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
153. See, e.g., R&clamation n'38/2006, CESP contre France [CESP v. France],
Conseil de l'Europe [Council of Europe], available at http://www
.coe.int/t/f/droits de l'homme/cse/4_R%C3%A9clamationscollectives/Liste des
R%C3%A9clamations/default.asp; Syndicat National des Officiers de Police
[National Trade Union of Police Officers], http://www2.snop-snapc.fr
/newsite/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=564&Itemid=67 (stating
that all of the members of the French police can benefit from the European
Committee of Social Rights decision that France has violated the European Social
Charter concerning over-time remuneration).
154. See North American Free Trade Agreement pmbl., U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993).
155. Id.
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may release the report publicly. 5 6 Additionally, a NAFTA side
agreement allows individuals and NGOs to submit complaints to a
national administrative office in each country when one of the
countries fails to enforce its labor laws.' 57 "Many of the complaints
relate to the failure of a government to ensure that private businesses
abide by labor laws" and the findings are made public. 8 These two
side agreements are therefore "important steps forward in explicitly
linking international trade liberalization with social concerns."' 59
They have been described as "the most effective mechanisms
existing today for victims ... to hold private businesses indirectly
' 60
accountable to at least a small range of rights."'
However, the task of corporate compliance with human rights is
best resolved when undertaken by French and American corporations
themselves. Such self-enforcement has recently been the subject of
intense international debate.

II. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW TO AMERICAN AND FRENCH

COMPANIES
A. FROM VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES TO BINDING OBLIGATIONS
1. Corporate Voluntary Initiatives to Comply with Human Rights
The past decade has seen a surge in voluntary initiatives
undertaken by corporations to actively respect human rights in their
activities. This trend has several explanations. First, over the past
twenty years, the scrutiny of private actors and their responsibilities
156. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation arts. 8-9,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force on Jan. 1,
1994) (calling for the Commission to meet at least once per year). The
Commission must also meet in special sessions as requested by any of the three
parties: Canada, the United States, or Mexico.
157. North American Agreement on Labor Co-operation art. 14, U.S.-Can.Mex., Sept. 13 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1502 (1993) (providing for the creation of the
National Administrative Offices at the federal levels of government in Canada,
Mexico, and the United States).
158. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 95.
159. Id. at 97.
160. Id. at92.
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under international law has increased.' 6 ' Anthony Ewing
characterizes this phenomenon as follows: "Beginning with the issue
of Apartheid in the 1970s, expanding in the 1980s to business
operations in countries with poor human rights records, and
exploding around labor conditions in the 1990s, human rights
activists have placed the private sector at the center of their advocacy
efforts.' 62 Second, many TNCs domiciled in the United States
adopted codes of conduct in the 1990s after discovering human rights
violations in the developing countries in which such companies
conducted business. 63 In these circumstances, the governments of
these developing countries did not enforce the law and some even
participated in their violation."6
Third, "the international
community's definition of corporate responsibility has evolved"
since Milton Friedman's statement that solely the government was
responsible for social issues. 65 Finally, the argument by economic
analysts that adopting human rights standards is profitable for the
66
corporation in the long run has gained credence. 1

161. See Ewing, supra note 108, at 29 (noting that during the same period, the
"economic power of governments" has decreased).
162. Id.
163. See Kimberly Gregalis Granatino, Corporate Responsibility Now: Profit at
the Expense of Human Rights with Exemption from Liability?, 23 SUFFOLK J.
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 191, 196 (1999) (arguing that these transgressions occur in
spite of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
164. Id. at 199 (providing China's deliberate violation of human rights and labor
rights as an example of a government knowingly aiding in the violation of human
rights); see also Frey, supra note 30, at 155-73 (detailing legislative and executive
efforts in the United States to address human rights issues within transnational
corporations that failed to be enacted into law).
165. Granatino, supra note 163, at 211-12; Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13,
1970, at SM17 (maintaining that a business's only social responsibility is to make
as much money as possible without breaking the laws made by governments).
166. See Granatino, supra note 163, at 210-11 n. 122 (observing that consumers
prefer products made by socially responsible companies); see also Marc J. Epstein
& Karen E. Schnietz, Social and Environmental Responsibility Does Pay Off,
ETHICAL CORP., Apr. 3, 2003, at 2, available at http://www.ethicalcorp.com
/content print.asp?ContendlD=475 (stating that after the WTO's failure in Seattle,
firms with a reputation for social and environmental responsibility were protected
from a significant decline in market value, whereas firms not considered socially
responsible suffered huge losses).
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Today, the concept of corporate responsibility includes social
responsibility16 and corporations have increasingly adopted codes of
conduct to conform to this evolving definition. A code of conduct is a
"formal statement of the values and business practices of a
corporation."' 68 These codes increasingly deal with human rights
protection for employees and stakeholders' 69 and companies are
encouraged to refer to an international human rights text in their

code. 170
American corporations were the first to adopt codes of conduct,
spurred on by private initiative.' 7' In the late 1970s, American
corporations in South Africa largely adopted the "Sullivan
Principles" to establish corporate responsibility in the political
climate of apartheid. 72 These principles were especially important in
that "the firms that took part adopted unprecedented, far-reaching
commitments to corporate social responsibility toward human rights
violations."' 73 They also served as a successful model for future
167. See Granatino, supra note 163, at 212 (asserting that corporate
responsibility requires a duty to promote human rights as well as a duty to
maximize profits).
168.

DEBORAH LEIPZINGER, THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY CODE BOOK 36

(2003).
169. See Cassel, supra note 8, at 1971-72 (stating that these codes often "address
forced labor, child labor, labor organizing and bargaining, non-discrimination,
worker health and safety, and in some cases minimum wage, and maximum hour
guidelines").
170. See FRANKENTAL & HOUSE, supra note 21, at 82-90 (providing examples
of codes of conduct that incorporate international human rights instruments such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
171. See Granatino, supra note 163, at 196-98 (stating that American
corporations in China adopted the first generation of codes of conduct and
encouraged other TNCs in China to adopt similar policies).
172. See id. at 208 (explaining that the Sullivan Principles aimed at preventing
employee discrimination in the areas of employment). The Sullivan Principles
required TNCs to pay fair wages, well above the minimum cost of living, provide
managerial training programs for blacks and other non-whites, provide their
workers supportive services for housing, health care, transportation and recreation,
and use corporate influence to help end Apartheid in South Africa. Id. at 208-09;
see also Patricia Arnold & Theresa Hammond, The Role of Accounting in
Ideological Conflict: Lessons from the South African Divestment Movement, 19
ACCT., ORG. & SOC'Y 111, 116 (1994) (stating that by 1986, 200 of the 260 U.S.
firms doing business in South Africa had adopted the Sullivan Principles). See
generally Sanctions Against South Africa, Sullivan Principles for U.S.
Corporations Operating in South Africa, Nov. 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 1464, 1496.
173. See Cassel, supra note 8, at 1970.

AM. U INT'L L. REv.

[23:855

codes of conduct in countries with prevalent human rights
conditions. 7 4 Similarly, the MacBride principles were initiated in the
mid-1980s by U.S. companies to protect Catholic workers in
5
Northern Ireland against discrimination benefiting Protestants.1
French companies, on the contrary, have historically not been as
active as American companies in adopting codes regulating corporate
activities abroad.
Nevertheless, both France and the United States have been
influenced by international organizations as an important source in
the drafting of codes of conducts. Codes are usually classified based
on the author of the code. 7 6 Codes can be drafted by private
individuals,'77 governments (in intergovernmental organizations or
alone), 78 or by corporations themselves. 19 As early as 1974, the
United Nations recognized the need for codes of conduct to
"maximize the contributions of transnational corporations to
economic development and growth and to minimize the negative
effects of the activities of these corporations" in developing
countries.18 0 The 2000 United Nations Global Compact further called
174. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 37, at 83 n.45 (explaining that the
U.S. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 based its Code of Conduct on the Sullivan
Principles).
175. See Cassel, supra note 8, at 1971 (stating that the MacBride Principles

focus on non-discrimination with "'one unusual commitment' . . . to make
reasonable, good faith efforts to protect the personal safety of their workers, at the
workplace but also traveling to and from work"). "As of February 1995, thirty-two
out of the eighty publicly traded U.S firms operating in Northern Ireland had
signed onto the MacBride Principles." Id. at 1972. See generally WILLIAM C.
THOMPSON, JR., THE MCBRIDE PRINCIPLES AND THE EQUALITY AGENDA IN
NORTHERN IRELAND: A STATUS REPORT 6 (Nov. 2006), available at

http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/pdfs/pr-06-11-084_macbride-principles.pdf
(describing New York's implementation of the MacBride Priniciples).
176. Granatino, supra note 163, at 201.
177. Id. at 201.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 202.
180. Id. at 202 n.65 (quoting the Preamble to the U.N. Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations). The Code of Conduct, presented in 1990, established

standards of conduct for host countries and TNCs, including respect of the
fundamental rights of workers, a prohibition on discrimination based on an
individual's exercise of freedoms, and the fair treatment of workers. Id. However,
the Code was never adopted, due in part to opposition stemming from the
numerous responsibilities placed upon TNCs compared to allocated to host
governments. Id. at 202-03.
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on companies to commit themselves to respect nine core principles in
relation to human rights, labor, and the environment. 8 '
Responding to this call from the United Nations for codes of
conduct, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") formulated guidelines to provide "voluntary
principles and standards for responsible business conduct consistent
with applicable laws."'8 2 These guidelines, with their "distinctive
implementation mechanisms," require TNCs to cooperate with
unions and create complaint procedures for resolving labor
disputes.' 8 3 These guidelines have served as a basis for private codes
of conduct'8 4 and are described as "the only multilaterally endorsed
and comprehensive code that governments are committed to
promoting."' 8 5
The elevated importance of labor issues within developing
countries was reinforced by the ILO adoption of the Tripartite
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy of 1977.186 Although the Declaration addresses solely
181. See Global Compact, supra note 65 (adding a tenth principle related to anticorruption). Hundreds of companies, including many of the world's largest, have
joined this initiative. See Official Website of U.N. Global Compact, Participants
and Stakeholders: Business Associations, http://www.unglobalcompact.org
(last visited Feb. 29,
/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/businessassociations.html
2008) (providing an updated list of business associations that have joined the
Global Compact).
182. OECD, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 15 (2000),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2008) [hereinafter OECD, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES].
183. See Granatino, supra note 163, at 203-04 (stating that TNCs must
cooperate with unions, must not interfere with contract negotiations, and must
provide timely notice and mitigation of layoffs).
184. Id. at 204 n.78.
185. See OECD, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note
182, at 5; OECD, Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises: Statements Made on
The Adoption of the Review 2000, 3 (2000) (commenting additionally that "[t]he
Guidelines' recommendations express the shared values of governments of
countries that are the source of most of the world's direct investment flows and
home to most multinational enterprises"). "We believe the revised guidelines can
have a strong positive impact on Multinational Enterprises' (MNEs) contributions
to economic, environmental and social progress. The Guidelines aim to promote
their positive contributions to economic, environmental and social progress." Id.
18; see BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 67.
186. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY

(4d
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labor issues, its complaint procedure is more extensive than the
OECD code187 and enforcement of ILO standards are done through
media disclosure to the public and notification to ILO officials of
TNCs' noncompliance.188
Both American and French governments have played a part in
encouraging corporations headquartered in their territories to adopt
codes of conduct. The United States, for example, adopted the
American Model Business Principles of 1995 to encourage such an
adoption of codes. 18 9 However, the U.S Council for International
Business prefers the OECD and ILO multilateral guidelines as these
do not put U.S.-based firms at a competitive disadvantage. 190 In
France, the European commitment to voluntary codes of conduct has
influenced the promotion of codes of conduct within French
businesses,' 9' although the focus remains on compulsory
governmental measures.
These differences in approach have spurred considerable
international debate. Amnesty International and Maplecroft, for
example, emphasize the "ongoing discussion on the relative merits of
voluntary initiatives [as done in the United States] and compulsory,
normative initiatives [as preferred in France]."' 9 Adopting codes of
conduct can have a positive impact on limiting human rights

ed. 2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/down
load/declaration2006.pdf [hereinafter TRIPARTITE DECLARATION].

187. Granatino, supra note 163, at 205 (explaining that a Standing Committee
on Multinational Enterprises investigates the TNC violations alleged by the ILO).
188. Id.
189. See Cassel, supra note 8, at 1974 (noting that President Clinton adopted the
American Model Business Principles as a way to unlink U.S trade policy with
China from human rights concerns).
190. Id. at 1975.
191. See generally Eur. Parl., Comm. on Development and Cooperation, Code
of Conduct for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries, 1999
O.J. (C 104) 180 (seeking to establish a European enforcement mechanism in order
to hold European MNCs to international standards governing labor rights, human
rights, minority and indigenous people's rights, environmental protection,
international security and corruption control).
192. See ALYSON WARHURST, KATY COOPER &
HUMAN

RIGHTS

NORMS

FOR

BUSINESS

AMNESTY INT'L, THE U.N.

14

(2004),

http://www.amnestyusa.org/business/unhrbusinessnorms.doc.

available

at
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violations'93 and has been described as "emphasiz[ing] the duty of
corporate responsibility and accountability."'' 94 Nevertheless, the
trend of adopting codes of conduct as a way of expressing adherence
to human rights norms is also viewed by many commentators as
insufficient.' 95
Most commentators note the "inability of voluntary approaches to
reduce persistent abuses and achieve compliance with generally
agreed substantive norms."' 196 Moreover, "the historical reality
[shows] that some form of legal framework is often necessary to
restrain abuses."'

97

2. Towards Binding Obligationson Corporations

Because of the increased influence corporations can have on
human rights, the traditional view of human rights law as solely
concerning the relationship between the state and the individual

98

is

99

seen as having "fallen behind global reality."' Because traditional
human rights doctrine was developed at a time when "international
business was less prominent and international economic

193. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 37, at 70 (arguing that American

corporate leadership can and has been able to promote basic human rights
standards through the voluntary adoption of human rights codes of conduct).
194. Granatino, supra note 163, at 194.
195. See id. at 221 (asserting that voluntary codes of conduct are insufficient
because they do not have expressly stated responsibilities or accountability that
ensures compliance with international laws).

196. AMNESTY INT'L, THE U.N.
TOWARD LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY

HUMAN

RIGHTS NORMS

FOR

BUSINESS:

12 (2004), available at http://www.global

policy.org/reformibusiness/2004/2004ainorms.pdf.
197. Id.
198. John P. Humphrey, The InternationalLaw of Human Rights in the Middle
Twentieth Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER
ESSAYS 75 (1973) (tracing the expansion of human rights law from domestic to
international and from the right to just treatment to the inclusion of economic and
social rights).
199. See Jennifer Johnson, Public-PrivateConvergence: How The PrivateActor
Can Shape Public International Labor Standards, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 291
(exploring the power of the private market actor in conjunction with State efforts
to change international human rights law).
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interdependence was far less important, ' 20 0 it is increasingly
challenged as "unrealistic" in relation to today's world.2 1
Commentators argue that "a narrow application of human rights
law is not conducive to furthering the protection of human rights and
subtracts from its credibility."'2 2 "Since international business is now
mobile enough to avoid stringent national regulations, or influential
enough to persuade against the adoption of such regulation,
international law must move beyond the traditional view towards
regulating all of the organs of the international community. 2 3 One
scholar even goes so far to say that TNCs "have transcended national
legal systems and ignored the feeble international system to make the
imposition of human rights norms nearly impossible. 2 4
Therefore, a "reconceptualization of the prevailing international
framework of accountability, as well as the legal status of MNCs
[multinational corporations] under international law" is needed.20 5
Indeed, "[t]he international community is realizing that in order to
achieve fuller and wider realization of human rights, the umbrella of
human rights obligations and their enforcement should cover
MNCs. ' 206

Since the Second World War, non-state actors, such as
international organizations, insurgent and rebel groups, 207 and
individuals, 20 are increasingly given rights and duties in
200. See Aguirre, supra note 24, at 58.
201. See Sigrun I. Skogly, Economic and Social Human Rights, Private Actors
and International Obligations, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 239 (Michael K. Addo ed.,
1999) (observing that a formalistic understanding of international law, rather than a
realistic view of the world, is the basis for the traditional definition of international
human rights law regarding private actors).
202. Aguirre, supra note 24, at 57.
203. Id. at 58.
204. Id. at 57.
205. Deva, supra note 27, at 2.
206. Id. at 1; see, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443,461 (2001).
207. See Aguirre, supra note 25, at 58 n.30 (discussing the duties on the part of
rebel groups to respect certain rules of combat, including protecting prisoners and
disallowing children to fight).
208. Sigrun I. Skogly, Economic and Social Human Rights, Private Actors and
International Obligations, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
AND
THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 239, 244 (Michael K. Addo
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international law.2 °9 Corporations have also been granted certain
rights found in human rights documents. The European Court of
Human Rights for example has recognized that companies can enjoy
rights such as rights to a fair trial, privacy, and aspects of freedom of
expression. 210 The right to freedom of expression, for example,

"applies to everyone, whether natural or legal persons 21I and
companies can bring legal claims to the ECHR to enforce these
rights. Therefore, even though companies have not taken part in
negotiating the treaty which creates obligations, there is "no
conceptual obstacle" [that] prevents states from requiring companies
'
to abide by legally binding international human rights obligations. 12
There is in fact debate as "to what extent ... international human

rights

standards

[have] already been applied directly to
First, the preamble of the UDHR calls on "every
individual and every organ of society" to "promote respect for" and
"secure ... recognition and observance" of human rights.21 4
Companies are included in "every organ of society" and therefore
"the Universal Declaration applies to them."2 5 However, the UDHR
is a declaration which does not create legally binding obligations,
companies. ' 2 1

ed., 1999) (conveying the traditional view that human rights law protects the
individual citizen from the state).
209. See Aguirre, supra note 24, at 58 (positing that the expansion of
international business over the past century has contributed to varying human
rights considerations).
210. Michael K. Addo, The Corporation As a Victim of Human Rights
Violations, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 187, 192-93 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999)
(admitting that the idea of corporations as victims seems odd, but arguing that if
entities' rights are protected, they will do their part in protecting human rights).
211. Autronic AG v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. Series A.178 (1990); 12 (1990)
E.H.R.R. 485 at 47 (stating that neither a party's legal status as a company nor its
commercial activity precludes it from protection).
212. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 57.
213. Id. at 58.
214. See UDHR, supra note 12, pmbl.
215. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 58 (quoting Professor Louis
Henkin at the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration in 1998); see also
FRANKENTAL & HOUSE, supra note 21, at 23; Office of the High Comm'r for
Human Rights, The Global Compact and Human Rights: UnderstandingSphere of

Influence and Complicity, in

EMBEDDING

HUMAN

RIGHTS

INTO BUSINESS

PRACTICE, supra note 108, at 14, 15 (stating that "[t]he concept of 'every organ of
society' covers private entities such as companies").
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although some of its articles are considered to be customary law. 16
The International Council on Human Rights Policy notes, however,
that the preamble is at least "an authoritative guide to the
interpretation of human rights articles in the UN Charter, which
themselves create legal obligations. ' 1 17 Article 30 of the UDHR also
states that "[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms set forth herein. '"21 s However, there is continuing
debate as to the legal force of Article 30.219
The Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
placed some level of responsibility on companies concerning
particular rights, such as the right to adequate food and the right to
health. 2 In declarations, U.N. member states have placed
responsibilities on businesses, which "hastens the transformation of
non-binding international standards for businesses into obligations of
'
a more legal character."221

216. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 289
(1996) (noting that once a provision is considered customary international law,
intergovernmental committees, tribunals, and organizations recognize its legally
binding nature on all states); see also Ewing, supra note 108, at 32 ("Some human
rights [in the UDHR] are so widely accepted that they have become part of
customary international law, or the international law that binds all states regardless
of whether states have ratified particular international treaties.").
217. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 61 n.164 (explaining that most
U.N. members have ratified treaties that refer directly to the UDHR, and some
provisions have even been incorporated into state constitutions and laws).
218. See UDHR, supra note 12, art. 30.
219. See Hannum, supra note 216, at 350 (noting that Article 30 of the UDHR,
also known as the "savings clause," is included in nearly all human rights treaties
and may simply be a warning not to act in opposition to the provisions of the
conventions).
220. See Comment 12, supra note 42, 20 (stating that while only States are
parties to the Covenant, and thus ultimately accountable, private companies should
pursue conduct that bolsters these rights); see also BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra
note 2, at 66-65.
221. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 65 (showing that most
members of the U.N. World Conference in the 1990s have "expected the private
sector to take on certain internationally-agreed responsibilities" with regards to the
environment in particular).
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The revision of the OECD Guidelines in 2000 demonstrates an
evolution towards the view that corporations should respect human
rights. The revision added that "[enterprises should] respect the
human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the
host government's international obligations and commitments. 2 22
Although the Guidelines are not legally binding, they have been
described "as a tool to interpret the meaning and application of
international instruments and domestic laws. 2 23
Additionally, the ILO Declaration recommends that all parties,
including employers, respect the UDHR, the Covenants, and the ILO
principles.2 24 Similarly, the Declaration is not legally binding but it
represents a "high-level statement of international public policy"
from an organization representing governments, employers, and
employees and has a higher number of member governments than the
OECD.22 5
The U.N. Norms, adopted in 2003, have provoked the most debate
on the direct application of human rights law to companies.226 The
U.N. Norms declare that "within their respective spheres of activity
and influence, transnational corporations and other business
enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of,

222. Id. at 66 (referring to paragraph 11.2 of the OECD Guidelines and arguing
that, despite the vague language of the revision, MNCs should define human rights
broadly, and measure their conduct against the host state's international obligations
and not merely its national laws).
223. Id. at 68. But see Norbert Horn, Codes of Conduct for MNEs and
Transnational Lex Mercatoria: An International Process of Learning and Law
Making, in 1 LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 45, 58 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980) (stating that because the OECD
Guidelines are an up-to-date consensus of developed nations about general
principles of international business regulation and public policy, complemented by
24 years of interpretative clarifications, they rise to the level of customary
international law).
224. See TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, supra note 186, 8 (creating a duty on the
part of organizations to respect all commitments and obligations concerning human
rights).
225. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 69 (stating that "the Tripartite
Declaration represents the authoritative voice of the vast majority of the world's
governments").
226. See David Weissbrot & Maria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regards to
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 903 (2003) (highlighting the enormous
attention that the Norms attracted in the corporate social responsibility field).
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respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in
international as well as national law.

22

The Norms "appear to be

more comprehensive and more focused on human rights" than any
other guidelines drawn up by governmental, private or corporate
initiatives. 22 s Moreover, they are mandatory in nature, as shown by
their implementation provisions, which go beyond the previous
international voluntary guidelines.22 9 The Norms also show the
importance of not limiting the debate to TNCs, of applying to "other
business enterprises, '23° and of addressing the issue of subcontractors
and suppliers, which was not addressed by the ILO Tripartite
Declaration and was only mentioned in the OECD Guidelines. 23'
There is heightened international debate regarding the precise
meaning and impact of the U.N. Norms. The Norms, at first glance,
can be seen as "not directly binding on corporations" 23 2 and have
been described as a "mere restatement of international human rights

227. U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 1 (noting in the commentary that the general
obligations apply to a corporation's activities occurring in its home country or any
other country).
228. Weissbrott & Kruger, supra note 226, at 912 (demonstrating that the
Norms restate a wide range of human rights principles and therefore reinforce
many earlier attempts to enforce greater social responsibility on corporations).
229. Id. at 913 (providing modes for implementation by business enterprises, by
the United Nations, and by other intergovernmental organizations). The author
adds that though the Norms are not primary sources of international law, they
could possibly be classified as customary international law. Id.
230. See U.N. Norms, supra note 1, 21 (defining "other business enterprises"
as "being any business entity, regardless of the international or domestic nature of
its activities, including a transnational corporation, contractor, subcontractor,
supplier, licensee or distributor; the corporate, partnership, or other legal form used
to establish the business entity; and the nature of the ownership of the entity").
231. See OECD, GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note
182, at 19 (stating that enterprises are to "encourage, where practicable, business
partners, including suppliers and sub-contractors, to apply principles of corporate
conduct compatible" with the OECD Guidelines); see also U.N. Norms, supra note
15 (declaring that "[e]ach transnational corporation or other business
1,
enterprise shall apply and incorporate these Norms in their contracts or other
arrangements and dealings with contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees,
distributors, or natural or other legal persons who enter into any agreement with
the transnational corporation or business enterprise in order to ensure respect for
and implementation of the Norms").
232. Troy Rule, Using "Norms" to Change International Law: U.N. Human
Rights Law Sneaking in Through the Back Door?, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 325, 326
(2004).
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'
law."233
However, they have also been viewed as "the first major
stepping stone towards the adoption of an international, enforceable
set of legal obligations binding on transnational corporations. 234 One
author has gone so far as to say that the Norms do in fact "legally
bind transnational corporations and other business enterprises. 2 35 In

any case, one source notes, "since the Norms are based on
international law, which countries have undertaken to be translated
into national law, a business enterprise might well expect to see
similar provision legally binding on it through national
legislation.

236

The U.N. Norms are soft law, meaning that they are presented in
the form of recommendations. As such, over a period of time, the
Norms may help establish customary law, serve as a guide for the
interpretation of a treaty, or even serve as the basis for the later
drafting of treaties. 237 It is only when a declaration has achieved
international consensus that it is codified in treaty form.2 38 However,
acquiring a consensus on binding obligations for corporations has
proven to be difficult. Importance is also given to the body having
enacted the declaration 3 9 and to whether the declaration is in fact
being complied with internationally.24 °

233. Id. (referencing a debate between two experts regarding the actual effect of
the U.N. Norms on transnational corporations).
234. Id.
235. See Campagna, supra note 29, at 1207 (contending that the monitoring and
implementation procedures to which corporations are bound reflect the legally
binding nature of the U.N. Norms).
236. Thomas E. McCarthy, Business and Human Rights: What Do the New U.N.
Norms Mean for the Business Lawyer, 28 INT'L LEGAL PRAC. 73, 74 (2003).
237. See Dinah L. Shelton, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft
Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NON-BINDING ACCORDS 119 (Edith
Brown Weiss ed., 1998) (distinguishing hard and soft international law);
Weissbrott & Kruger, supra note 226, at 914 (stating that hard law "is clearly
intended to create legally binding obligations from the outset, whereas soft law
starts in the form of recommendations and over a period of time may be viewed as
interpreting treaties and helping to establish custom or may serve as the basis for
the later drafting of treaties").
238. See Weissbrott & Kruger, supra note 231, at 914.
239. See id. at 915 (stating that the "higher the UN body and the closer to
consensus the vote in adopting soft-law principles such as the Norms, the greater
the authority they would obtain").
240. Id.
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The U.N. Norms were adopted by state representatives within the
Commission on Human Rights; furthermore, the principles contained
therein will be reinforced by views and recommendations to be
presented in 2008 to the U.N. Human Rights Council by John
Ruggie.241' Therefore, as one source said, the Norms "have room to
become more binding in the future. The level of adoption within the
United Nations, further refinement of implementation methods by
the working group, and increasingly broad acceptance of the Norms
will continue to play an important role in the development of their
binding nature. 2 42
B. ENSURING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

1. CorporateComplicity in Human Rights Abuse

When former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan first proposed
the Global Compact in January 1999, he called upon the business
world to "support and respect the protection of international human
rights within their spheres of influence" and "to make sure their own
corporations were not complicit in human rights abuses. 2 43 There
are, therefore, two ways for a company to be deemed responsible in a
human rights violation: either the company has directly violated a
human right that it had the duty to support and respect within its
sphere of influence, or the company is an accomplice of the human
rights violation, but not the principal actor. Complicity is a "large
part" of the "issue of corporate accountability for human rights or
international crimes 2 44 as states and businesses often violate rights

241. See Ruggie Report, supra note 3.
242. See Weissbrott & Kruger, supra note 226, at 915.
243. See Global Compact, supra note 65, Principles 1-2; Kofi A. Annan,
Secretary-General, Address to World Economic Forum in Davos (Feb. 1, 1999)
(discussing ideas that were codified in the Global Compact as Principles 1 and 2).
244. Mark Taylor, Corporate Fallout Detectors and Fifth Amendment
Capitalists:CorporateComplicity in Human Rights Abuse, in EMBEDDING HUMAN
RIGHTS IN BUSINESS PRACTICE 44, 48 (Mark Taylor ed., 2003); see BEYOND

supra note 2, at 125; see also Ewing, supra note 109, at 39 (stating
that "allegations of corporate complicity in human rights abuse appear with
increasing frequency and pressure for corporate human rights accountability is
growing").
VOLUNTARISM,
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together. It has "relative youth as a political problem"245 and there is
therefore ongoing debate on the delimitation of parameters of
corporate complicity. Hence, clarifying the notion of corporate
complicity is essential to seeing "how close a company need be to
any human rights violation for it to be considered responsible in
some way.

' 246

Authors advance three categories

of corporate

complicity in human rights abuses: direct, indirect and silent
2 47

complicity.

First, "companies are directly complicit when they knowingly
assist or encourage human rights abuses by others.

' 248

A company is

directly complicit in a human rights abuse if "contractors, joint
venture partners, the host government, or other independent actors
abuse human rights on behalf of, or with the active aid and
encouragement

of the company.

'249

International

criminal

law

provides guidance on the requirements for direct complicity under
the legal standard of "aiding and abetting.

' 25 0

First, case law from the

two ad hoc international criminal tribunals suggests that "direct
complicity requires intentional participation, but not necessarily any
intention to do harm, only knowledge of foreseeable harmful
effects.

'25 1

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stated

245. See Taylor, supra note 244, at 48.
246. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 121 (stating that the
determination of whether a company is a principal actor or an accomplice is based
upon the following: the company's intentions; whether the company had
knowledge of the violations; whether the company's actions helped cause the
violations; and the relationship between the company, victims, and perpetrators).
247. See Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categoriesof Corporate Complicity in
Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 339, 342-49 (2001)
(noting that all three types of complicity require that the corporation have
knowledge of the human rights abuse).
248. See Ewing, supra note 108, at 39 (grounding the concept of direct
complicity in international criminal law, cases of which are prosecuted in forums
such as the International Criminal Court).
249. Id. (providing examples of when a company would be directly complicit,
such as paying local security forces to abuse human rights or providing equipment
to local security forces to be used to abuse human rights).
250. Id. (defining the "aiding and abetting" standard as when a company
provides "substantial or material assistance" and has knowledge of the
consequences that are likely to occur as a result of this assistance).
251. See Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 247, at 342 (emphasizing that a
corporation can be directly complicit in a human rights violation when it violates
or assists in violating customary international law regarding human rights).
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that "the accomplice need not even wish that the principal offence be
committed.

2 52

Therefore, a corporation, argues one source, need not

"actually wish the [human rights violation]. It is enough if the
corporation or its agents knew of the likely effects of their
assistance. 253 Second, international criminal law affirms that "all
criminal systems provide that an accomplice can be tried in the
absence of the conviction of the principal perpetrator. 2

54

This means

that that "the abuse must have occurred but does not have to have
' Thus, a corporation can
been formally proven in a court of law."255
be liable for contributing to human rights abuses even if the primary
perpetrator of a human rights violation has not been found
responsible.
Second, companies are indirectly complicit "if the company
benefits from human rights abuses committed by someone else, even
if the company did not authorize, direct or have prior knowledge of
the activities. 256 The company must have knowledge that human
rights abuses are taking place. 57 Some authors concentrate on the
primary actor being a government,258 whereas others recognize that
252. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, 539, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept.
2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu, Judgment] (reiterating that willingness to participate
in the principal offense does not have to be established, only knowledge is
required).
253. See Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 249, at 346 (arguing that an accomplice
corporation can be held liable where it makes the decision to participate in or assist
another in perpetrating human rights abuses); see also Akayesu, Judgment, supra
note 252, 539 (stating that "anyone who knowing of another's criminal purpose,
voluntarily aids him or her in it, can be convicted of complicity even though he
regretted the outcome of the offence").
254. See Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 252, 531 (quoting the Rwandan Penal
Code which states that accomplices can be prosecuted where the perpetrator may
not be prosecuted because the perpetrator is insane, dead, or unidentified).
255. See Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 247, at 342 (noting that the accomplice
need not actually desire the offense be committed).
256. See Ewing, supra note 108, at 39 (clarifying that the company must know
abuses are taking place, but need not have knowledge prior to the abuses being
committed).
257. Id. (quoting Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to
Rangoon, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 150 (2002), stating that "knowledge of
ongoing human rights violations, plus acceptance of direct economic benefit
arising from violations, and continued partnership with the host government should
give rise to accomplice liability").
258. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 132 (noting that governments
are often motivated to provide infrastructure; to provide resources; to provide
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the principal violators of human rights may also be any other actor,
such as a business partner or a supplier. 9

When a government is primarily responsible for a human rights
abuse, companies may benefit in at least three ways. 260 First,
governments could violate certain human rights in the construction
of infrastructure for business use. The Danish Human Rights and
Business Project has stated the Unocal case represents an example of
this. 261 Governments could also commit abuses to favor companies
over its residents.2 62 The International Council on Human Rights
Policy has stated that allowing a luxury hotel project to be built on
tribal lands, thereby damaging the tribes' ability to fish is such an
example.2 63 Finally, allowing repression to hinder labor unrest is
another way in which governments can cater to companies'
interests."6 This happened, for example, in apartheid South Africa,

suppression of labor unrest). These government projects may lead to human rights
abuses by private actors.
259. See Ewing, supra note 108, at 39; see also Global Compact, supra note 65,
Principle 2 (stating that beneficial complicity "[s]uggests that a company benefits
directly from human rights abuses committed by someone else").
260. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 131-32 (listing three forms of
abuse which create an environment whereby the corporation benefits from the
abuses even if it does not aid in or cause the human rights violations itself).
261. See THE HUMAN RIGHTS & BUSINESS PROJECT, DEFINING THE SCOPE OF
BUSINESS RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABROAD 10-11, available at

http://www.humanrights.dkihumanrightsbusiness/index.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2008) (describing a situation in which a joint venture was undertaken between
several international oil companies including Unocal, the Burmese government and
the Burmese state oil company to construct an oil pipeline. The state oil company
was in charge of providing labor and security for the construction of the gas
pipeline. Allegations later emerged that the state oil company had used forced and
child labor and violated other human rights in order to clear the area and provide
security).
262. See CRAIG FORCESE,

PUTTING CONSCIENCE

INTO

COMMERCE

21-22

(International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development 1997)
(providing an example in Suriname where the government was accused of forcibly
relocating residents of lands in favor of Canadian mining companies that have
mineral rights).
263. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 132 (referring to Hopu v.
France).
264. See FORCESE, supra note 262, at 22 (listing examples in Sri Lanka and
Indonesia where troublesome workers were assaulted and disappeared, in the
Philippines where pro-union workers were "visited," abducted, and tortured by
agents of the government, and in Burma where a strike was broken by a
government paramilitary unit).
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where black union activity was suppressed by security forces to
benefit white businesses.26 5 Under existing principles of criminal law
and tort law, however, "if the company really just passively benefits
from the government's wrongdoing, it will not be responsible. 2 66
Yet, "the idea that companies are morally complicit if they passively
benefit from violations is gaining ground" 267 and is stated in the
Global Compact.26 8 Therefore, it has been suggested that "to accept
the benefits of measures by governments or local authorities to
improve the business climate which themselves constitute violations
of human rights, makes a company a party to those violations. 2 69
When the primary actor of the violation is a non-state actor,
however, beneficial complicity could occur "if a corporation
tolerates or knowingly ignores the human rights violations of one of
its business partners committed in furtherance of its common
business objectives": for example, buying materials from a supplier
that violates human rights or that tolerates poor working
conditions.2 7 °
Third, silent complicity occurs when "a company is aware that
human rights violations are occurring, but does not intervene with
the authorities to try and prevent or stop the violations. '27' Although

265. Id. at 22-23 (mentioning the suppression of black interests by the white
South African government during apartheid); see also BEYOND VOLUNTARISM,
supra note 2, at 132.
266. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 132 (charging that a passive
benefit often easily slides into more active complicity regarding human rights
abuses, thereby opening corporations to legal accountability).
267. Id. (arguing that a corporation which knows of human rights abuses must
take reasonable steps to prevent the abuse so that they are not accused of passive
complicity).
268. See Global Compact, supra note 65 (acknowledging that complicity is a
difficult concept to understand and, therefore, to enforce, because society and its
expectations are constantly changing).
269. See AMNESTY INT'L & PAX CHRISTI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A REPORT 45, 51 (1998) (noting that a corporation is complicit in
human rights abuses if an individual's rights are violated due to his or her
opposition to the corporation).
270. See Ewing, supra note 108, at 39 (indicating that incidents of corporate
silent complicity often occur in relation to violations committed by security forces
upon groups or people).
271. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 133 (providing examples of
silent complicity, such as when a company remains silent while an employee is
arbitrarily arrested for union activities, or when systematic discrimination takes

2008]

BUSINESS

& HUMAN RIGHTS LA W

903

the parameters of silent complicity and the conditions for triggering
such complicity are being defined, systematic human rights is a
leitmotiv. 2 This means that "companies operating in states widely
known or subject to international sanctions for gross and systematic
human rights violations are at high risk of silent complicity human
rights abuse. '27 J This is because human rights abuse is so evident that
it should force the company to take action. 274 Therefore, silent
complicity is easier to find when TNCs operate in countries with
repressive or corrupt governments.27 5 It is still not clear whether
''silent complicity would give rise to a finding of breach of legal
obligation against a company in a court of law. ' 27 6 Nevertheless, the
moral consequences of inaction in such a situation are not to be
underestimated.27 7 Therefore, even if "silent complicity does not yet
trigger international legal responsibility for companies, [it] is
28
considered by many to be a moral obligation of the private sector.

place); see also Ewing, supra note 108, at 39 (listing examples of silent complicity
such as acceptance of discrimination or failure to protest government actions that
result in human rights violations).
272. See Ewing, supra note 108, at 40 (listing other factors which may be
looked at when evaluating a corporation's silent complicity of human rights
violations, including whether the corporation's actions help establish the violating
government's legitimacy, whether the corporation has the power to change the
situation, and whether the corporation could feasibly leave the market that
encourages human rights violations altogether).
273. Id. (emphasizing that current international standards do not find that a
corporation is automatically complicit simply because they exist in a country
where abuses are occurring). However, the evolving concept of silent complicity is
opening the door to possible legal liability for corporations if they exist in violating
countries.
274. Id. (acknowledging that silent complicity is the most difficult kind of
complicity for corporations to understand and against which to guard).
275. See FRANKENTAL & HOUSE, supra note 22, at 23-24 (specifying that the
limits of silent complicity vary from country to country and depend on the

country's cultural context). But see
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A TIME OF CHANGE

L. AVERY, BUSINESS AND
22 (2002) (quoting Sir Geoffrey Chandler,

CHRISTOPHER

Chair of the Amnesty International Business Group, stating, "Silence or inaction
will seem to provide comfort to oppression and may be adjudged complicity ....
Silence is not neutrality. To do nothing is not an option").
276. See Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 247, at 348 (realizing that many
corporations who strive to avoid accusations of silent complicity do so as part of a
"sensible risk management plan").
277. Id.
278. See Ewing, supra note 108, at 39-40.
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"Corporate complicity at the international level has had less
attention due to the obvious lack of international courts with
jurisdiction.1 27 9 The International Criminal Court, for example, has
no jurisdiction over corporations. 280 Nevertheless, plaintiffs
increasingly use the theory of corporate complicity in domestic law
suits against corporations. As such, defining the parameters of
corporate complicity is especially important.2 81 The International
Commission for Jurists, for example, was created in 2006 to
"develop the legal and public policy meaning of corporate complicity
in the worst violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law that amount to international crimes. 2 82 Therefore,
the emergence of the notion of corporate compliance affects both
French and American companies, although the effect differs because
of divergence in the ways these companies can be held accountable.
2. Holding CompaniesAccountablefor Human Rights Abuse
It is primarily through domestic law suits that individuals will seek
to hold TNCs accountable for abusive practices. The ways in which
American and French TNCs can be held accountable for their human
rights violations overseas varies widely.
In the United States, the opportunities for individuals to use
international law in domestic proceedings against companies are
mixed: the United States is not party to all international human rights
279. See Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 247, at 349 (observing that intentional
complicity is accepted by the international community as a breach of human rights
law).
280. See Ewing, supra note 108, at 39 (observing, however, that the ICC's
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, is using his jurisdiction over individuals to
investigate the possibility of corporate complicity in governmental war crimes in
the Democratic Republic of Congo).
281. Ewing, supra note 108, at 40 (discussing several ATCA cases in American
courts that dealt with international human rights violations); see also John Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 969 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(suggesting that ATCA cases can be filed under legal concepts such as joint
venture, agency, negligence, and recklessness).
282. See Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, International Commission
of Jurists - Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes,
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Updates/Archive/ICJPaneloncomplicity (last
visited Apr. 12, 2008) (detailing that the final report of the panel will become
public in early 2008, and will clarify the definition and limits of complicity by
looking at law, policy, and practice).
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agreements, and even when it is, the agreements need implementing
legislation. 83 On the other hand, "[c]ourts in the United States have
pioneered the use of civil remedies to sue human rights violators
under the Alien Torts Claim Act [ATCA]. '2 84
ATCA allows aliens to bring civil actions in U.S. district courts
for torts committed "in violation of the laws of nations (now
understood to mean customary international law) or a treaty of the
United States. ' 285 ATCA "became a vehicle for human rights
cases" 28 6 with a 1980 Second Circuit decision, Filartiga v. PenaIrala, which used ATCA to punish human rights abuses by a state
against a citizen. 7 In 1995, the Second Circuit recognized that
certain forms of conduct by "private individuals" violated the law of
nations, which "opened up the possibility of suing corporations
288
allegedly involved in human rights abuses outside the US [sic].
The defendant is to have been personally served while physically
present within the territory of the United States,289 which, for a
corporation, means that it must be headquartered or doing business in
the United States. 9 °
283. See Official Website of the Web-Based Project on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 5: Cases/Applications, http://ccnmtl
.columbia.edu!projects/mmt/udhr/article_5/cases_5.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter Columbia Project] (admitting that Congress only ratified the U.N.
Torture Convention in 1990, and official ratification was postponed until 1994 so
that the RUDs-reservations, understandings, and declarations--could be passed
along with implementing regulations).
284. Id. (explaining that cases can be brought under the ATCA without any sort
of official approval, and that they can be brought by individuals as long as the
courts have jurisdiction).
285. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Litigating Corporate Responsibility (June 1, 2001),
http://old.lse.ac.uk/collections/globalDimensions/seminars/humanRightsAndCorpo
rateResponsibility/steinhardtTranscript.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
286. Id.
287. See Columbia Project, supra note 283 (quoting, in its "Filrtiga (2)"
section, the 1980 Second Circuit case Filartiga v. Pena-Iralastating that "torture
•.. violates universally accepted norms").

288. Id. (describing, in its "Post-Karadzic" section, the case Kadic v. Karadzic
and stating that non-state actors could be held responsible under ATCA if their
crimes were heinous enough).
289. See Sandra Coliver, Executive Dir. of the Ctr. for Justice & Accountability,
The Alien Tort Claims Act: What Next After Alvarez-Machain, http://www
.cja.org/projects/writingsdocs/Sandy%20whats%20next.htm (last visited Apr. 12,
2008) (noting that personal service applies in cases of individual defendants).
290. Columbia Project, supra note 283.
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ATCA has been used against a number of corporations.291
Examples include a case against the Anglo-Dutch oil company,
Shell, for its alleged complicity in grave human rights abuses in
Ogoniland, Nigeria,2 92 and a case against the Canadian company,
Talisman Energy, for its alleged complicity in genocide in Sudan.293
ATCA has also been used to sue for corporate abuses committed in
the United States. 294 The Supreme Court recently affirmed in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain its "liberal judicial interpretation of the ATCA that

enables victims of human rights abuses to sue their abusers in U.S.
2 95

courts."

291. See Marc Lifsher, Unocal Settles Human Rights Lawsuit Over Alleged
Abuses at Myanmar Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at C1 (referring to cases
against Exxon Mobil in Indonesia, Fresh Del Monte Produce in Guatemala,
ChevronTexaco in Nigeria, and Occidental Petroleum, Coca-Cola, and coal miner
Drummond in Colombia); see also BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 104
(listing uses of ATCA against corporations: "Shell (for its alleged role in the
events that led to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria); Chevron (for its
alleged role in supporting violent government suppression of protestors on an offshore platform in Nigeria); Unocal (for alleged complicity in the use of forced
labor in Burma); Texaco (on the basis of claims that it is destroying the
Ecuadorean rainforest); Exxon-Mobil (for alleged complicity in abuses committed
by Indonesian security forces in Aceh); and Coca-Cola together with bottlers of its
soft drinks in Colombia (for alleged complicity in the suppression by paramilitaries
of union activity, including the killing of a union activist at a bottling plant)").
292. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65601, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2006) (discussing the events leading up to the
execution of campaigner Ken Saro-Wiwa).
293. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 289, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing the alleged collaboration between
Talisman and Sudan's military to "dispose of citizens" and to carry out "cleaning
up operations" in Sudanese villages).
294. See Hawa Abdi Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 365-66 (D.N.J. 1998)
(denying a motion to dismiss filed by a corporation that ran a detention facility on
the grounds that the corporation was working for the government and was
therefore a state actor).
295. See Coliver, supra note 289; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 725, 733 n.20 (2004) (acknowledging that common law provides for some
specific causes of action under ATCA, but rejecting Alvarez's claim as lacking this
requisite specificity and citing conflicting cases that imply international law may
or may not extend to private actors); Rachel Chambers, The Unocal Settlement:
Implicationsfor the Developing Law on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights
Abuses, 13 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 14, 15 (2005) (stating that the Sosa case allowed for
more international human rights cases against corporations). Chambers adds that
the cases brought after Sosa have more difficulty proving standing under the
ATCA than cases prior to Sosa.
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In one major case, Doe v. Unocal, ATCA was used against Unocal
for allegedly knowingly using forced labor to construct its Yadana
gas pipeline in Burma. 96 The case has been settled, which bolsters
other ATCA cases and "signals to corporations that this law is
applicable to them, and that they are going to face major
litigation. 2 97
The scope of ATCA, however, is limited. The violation must be
"definable, universal and obligatory ' ' 98 and case law shows the torts
that meet these standards are "genocide, crimes against humanity,
slavery, torture, extrajudicial killing, disappearances, and cruel
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that would constitute
a violation of the Constitution if committed against a U.S citizen. '"299
Although these standards are difficult to prove, ATCA has the
benefit of encouraging settlement before claims are resolved in
court.3 00
U.S. tribunals can also be used to judge corporate abuses on the
basis of domestic law. Nike, for example, was held liable under
California state law for false corporate social responsibility
statements.30 1 This ruling signals to corporations that they must
exercise prudence when asserting their compliance with human
rights norms.30 2
France epitomizes the opposite of the United States in this regard.
In France, judges are accustomed to applying international law in
domestic cases because domestic judges readily apply ECHR and

296. Steinhardt, supra note 285.
297. See Lifsher, supra note 291, at 1 (quoting Robert Benson, a Loyola law
school professor who specializes in international human rights law).
298. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
299. Coliver, supra note 289.
300. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 105 (indicating that
settlement is encouraged by cases seeking to access unjustly earned profits).
301. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 663 (2003); David Monsma & John
Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges of Social
and EnvironmentalDisclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 195 (2004).

302. See BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 105-06 (advancing the notion
that the potential for liability, as indicated by previous lawsuits, probably
encourages multinational corporations to respect human rights).

908

AM. U. INT' L. RE V.

[23:855

European Court of Justice decisions as sources of law.3 °3 However,
again contrary to the United States, the possibility of litigation
against corporations on the basis of international human rights
standards has not been explored.
According to Sherpa, a French association created to defend
victims of TNCs, °4 domestic law is insufficient to hold companies

accountable. For one, the prosecutor can filter cases concerning torts
committed abroad.

French law therefore limits the extraterritorial

action of domestic judges 30 6 and the procedures can take too- long to
afford meaningful justice.30 7 Sherpa denounces this by stating that
finding a TNC liable for "economic and social crimes" is "more
difficult" than bringing Slobodan Milosevic to justice before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.0 8

303. Edward A. Tomlinson, The Saga of Wiretapping in France: What It Tells
Us About the French Criminal Justice System, 53 LA. L. REV. 1091, 1098-1103
(1993) (discussing the role of the European human rights law system in French
courts).
304. Sherpa was created in March 2002 by William Bourdon, former Secretary
General of the International Federation of Human Rights, to bring together
European and international jurists with the aim of condemning TNCs that profit
from lax environmental and social legislation in developing countries. See Sherpa,
Revue de Presse sur L'Association Sherpa [Press Review for the Sherpa
Association],
http://www.asso-sherpa.org/revuedepresse/revuedepresse-sherpa
.html (describing the international events that led to the necessity of such an
association); see also Sherpa, http://www.asso-sherpa.org/ (providing more
information on the liability of companies in France).
305. See Sherpa, Une Nouvelle Etape dans la Responsabilit& des Entreprises [A
New Stage in the Responsibility
of Corporations], http://www.assosherpa.org/Dossier%20Page%20index/Liens%20une%20nouvelle%20%e9tape%2
Odans%201a%20RSE.html (arguing that the prosecutor's veto right should be
removed).
306. Novethic.fr, Une Association de Juristes Pour Dfendre les Victimes des
Multinationales [An Association of Lawyers to Defend the Victims of
Multinationals],
http://www.novethic.fr/novethic/site/article/imprimer.jsp?id
=26589 (last visited Apr. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Association de Juristes].
307. See Jacques Clement, La responsabilit6 sociale en d~bat au Forum social
europ~en [Social Responsibility Debated at the European Social Forum],
http://www.asso-sherpa.org/revuede presse/revuedepresse-sherpa.html (discussing
the criminal and civil complaint filed in 2002 against a subsidiary of the French
Rougier Group by Sherpa on behalf of Cameroonian villagers for illegal
exploitation of forests which was described as "very long" by Samuel Nguiffo
from Friends of the Earth).
308. See Sherpa, "Plus difficile" de traduire en justice des entreprises que
Milosevic ["More Difficult" to Bring Companies to Justice than Milosevic],

2008]

BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS LA W

909

A vivid example is the difference in treatment afforded to
Burmese plaintiffs complaining against the American company
Unocal and those complaining against the French company Total.
Total was one of the partners of the joint venture between Unocal
and the Burmese government. Total was initially one of the
defendants in the American lawsuit launched in California, but an
amicus curiae brief from France convinced the judge of its inaptitude
to involve Total in the litigation, namely due to the principle of
sovereignty.30 9 As France does not have the equivalent of the
American ATCA, the plaintiffs used French criminal law to bring a
suit against Total in France. The difficulty is that the criminal code
prohibits only certain crimes committed abroad and additionally
requires that the perpetrator be French."' Therefore, in contrast to the
Unocal plaintiffs, who managed to create an incentive for the
company to settle, plaintiffs in French courts have no similar remedy
under the same set of facts.
Both the United States and France are nonetheless affected by
certain procedural difficulties confronting individuals seeking to
bring lawsuits against corporations. In many cases, parent companies
escape liability even though they effectively control their
subsidiaries. Only in exceptional cases will courts "pierce the
corporate veil."3 1 This "often precludes the extension of liability to

http://www.asso-sherpa.org/revuedepresse/revuedepresse-sherpa.html
(quoting
William Bourdon as further stating that finding responsibility for illegal
deforestation or child labor is nearly impossible today, although not unrealizable).
309. RFI.fr, Droits de I'homme: Plainte contre Total pour "Travaux Forces" en
Birmanie [Human Rights: Complaint Against Total for Forced Labor in Burma],
http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/032/article_ 17575.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
310. Id.
311. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational
Corporations Under United States Law: Conceptual and ProceduralProblems, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. SuPP. 493, 494 (2002) (highlighting the application of the
concepts of limited liability and corporate responsibility as applied to parentsubsidiary corporate relationships); see also Philip I. Blumberg, The Increasing
Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary
Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295, 305-06 (1996) (addressing the
concept of control with respect to parent-subsidiary corporate relationships in the
United States); David Aronofsky, Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil:
Trends, Developments and the Need for Widespread Adoption of Enterprise
Analysis, 10 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 31, 41 (1985) (explaining that a parent
company normally is not subject to liability unless operating with total disregard
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31 2
the parent entity for the actions or omissions of the affiliate." '

Additionally, in France, the parent corporation cannot be subject to a
lawsuit alleging complicity unless its subsidiary has been condemned
in the host country.3 13 Furthermore, in the United States, the doctrine

of forum non conveniens allows judges to refuse a case when it
deems itself not a suitable forum. Forum non conveniens is said to
"shield multinationals from liability for injuries abroad."3" 4 The

equivalent does not apply in France as French tribunals follow
international private laws derived from European regulations to
U.N. Norms do not address either
determine their competence.3 5 The
16
issues.
procedural
of these two
Individuals can also use the international forum to bring lawsuits
against corporations. There are, however, "very few international

procedures that can be used to scrutinize

corporate conduct

for the subsidiary company, making the subsidiary and the parent one and the
same).
312. Surya Deva, UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction, 10
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 520 n. 145 (2004); see Sherpa, Une Nouvelle Etape
dans la Responsabilit6 des Entreprises [A New Stage in the Responsibility of
Corporations], http://www.asso-sherpa.org/Dossier/ 20Page%20index/Liens%20
une%20nouvelle%20%e9tape%20dans%201a%20RSE.html (welcoming President
Nicolas Sarkozy's statement, made on October 25, 2007, denouncing the impunity
of parent companies for environmental abuse by their subsidiaries).
313. See Association de Juristes, supra note 306 (quoting William Bourdon as
stating that this is particularly troubling in countries where the legal system is the
subject of corruption and where the TNCs are not likely to be bothered).
314. See

JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM

144 (1993); Dow Chem. Co. v. Domingo Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674,
680 (Tex. 1990) (stating that the court, while rejecting the plea of forum non
conveniens in a case brought by farm workers of Costa Rica against Shell Oil and
Dow Chemicals, observed that the doctrine is not really about "convenience but
connivance to avoid corporate responsibility"); Duval-Major, supra note 55, at
650-51 (presenting flaws in the doctrine of forum non conveniens including an
unclear standard for dismissal and inability of foreign plaintiffs to obtain a fair
settlement if they are denied access to courts of the United States); INCONVENIENT
FORUM AND CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPAL CASE 1-30 (Upendra Baxi
ed., N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd. 1986).
315. See e.g., R~glement N' 44/2001, CE, Dec. 22, 2000, available at
http://www.lexinter.netlUE/reglement du_20_decembre_2000_surla-competence
_judiciaire et l'executiondesjugements.htm.
316. Deva, supra note 312, at 520-21 (observing that these procedural
loopholes, such asforum non conviens, have largely benefited TNC's).
BHOPAL
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directly."3'17 International forums tend to judge a state's318 or an
individual's actions.

19

However, the OECD and ILO provide certain

possibilities to judge a corporation's conduct. The OECD Guidelines
provide for National Contact Points ("NCPs") which can be asked to
intervene by member states, companies, employees, and even NGOs
if they believe a corporation is violating the Guidelines.320 These
NCPs can then mediate the issue between the complainant and the
company, make statements and recommendations, and refer the
complaint to the OECD's Committee on Investment and
Multinational Enterprises-although the identity of the company
cannot be revealed.32 As for the within the ILO, governments,
workers, and employers can ask the Sub-Committee on Multinational
Enterprises to interpret its ILO Tripartite Declaration. However, this
procedure does not judge the conduct of individual companies and
the companies' names are kept confidential.322 International
proceedings are therefore lacking to judge a French or American

317. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 99.
318. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION WITH
YOUNG PEOPLE 303, available at http://www.eycb.coe.int/compass/en/pdf/4-3.pdf
(indicating that the International Court of Justice is for state complaints against
other states and the ECJ ensures that the law is consistent among European
nations); Official Website of European Court of Human Rights, Applicants:
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/
Asked
Questions,
Frequently
(last visited
Applicants/Information+for+applicants/Frequently+asked+questions/
Apr. 1, 2008) (indicating that individuals as well as states may bring cases against
states to the ECHR). The International Court of Justice is for state complaints
against other states; the ECHR or ECJ is for individual complaints against states.
319. Official Website of International Criminal Court, About the Court,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html (indicating that the court tries individuals);
Official Website of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, General
(introducing the
Information, http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH1/geninfo/index.htm
ICTR as a forum established to prosecute individuals).
320. OECD, Decision of the Council on the OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational
Enterprises, at 2, 4-6, C(2000)/96/FINAL (July 19, 2000), available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT000 1016/$FILE/00080619.
PDF (mapping out the purpose and basic procedural guidelines for National
Contact Points); BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 100 (stating that "the
Guidelines allow 'other parties concerned' also to make such a complaint and this
broad phrase apparentlyincludes NGOs").
321. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 2, at 100-01 (stating that the
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise is the body
that "has ultimate responsibility" over the Guidelines).
322. Id. at 101.
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corporation's conduct and the focus for potential liability remains
domestic proceedings.

CONCLUSION
Both France and the United States regulate their companies to
comply with certain human rights standards, however the diverging
manner in which this is done reflects a continual balance between the
two countries.
The recent corporate social responsibility movement highlights the
historical differences between these two countries regarding state
interventionism. Certainly, regulation of companies exists in the
United States and French companies have adopted codes de conduite.
Nevertheless, corporate compliance in the United States is primarily
marked by voluntary corporate compliance initiatives, whereas in
France, companies rely on government regulation, influenced by the
European Union.
Furthermore, the French and American justice systems reflect
marked differences in the manner in which plaintiffs can complain of
a corporation's human rights abuse. In France, the fact that the
European Convention on Human Rights applies to French judges
allows citizens to complain of human rights violations under its
framework. Furthermore, in contrast to the United States, France is
party to a number of international instruments providing for
individual complaints. However, the United States has a more
developed domestic system for ensuring liability of corporations,
foreign or domestic, by plaintiffs, American or alien, through the use
of the Alien Tort Claims Act. The difference in treatment between
Burmese plaintiffs in France against Total, resulting in a dismissal of
the case, and in the United States against Unocal, resulting in a
settlement for the plaintiffs, reflects this difference.
These differences between the United States and France show a
continual balance between the two countries to enforce human rights
standards within their countries, in accordance with their historical
conceptions of the role of business, government interventionism,
stakeholders versus shareholders, and international law.
Since 2002, there has been a boost in international guidance on the
topic of applying human rights standards to business, including the
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Global Compact and the U.N. Norms. John Ruggie's role as Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human
Rights is a novel position that, despite initial opposition from the
United States, reflects the international community's view that
corporate accountability should be further scrutinized.
As the international community moves forward in elaborating an
international consensus, it will be crucial to combine views from
both the business and the international human rights arenas. This
consensus should combine an increased profitability for business and
an enhanced respect of certain human rights standards, which will
ultimately be beneficial for all involved-employees, employers,
investors, consumers, and individuals affected by the corporate
activity. Ultimately, the international community will need to borrow
elements from both American and French approaches to this debate
to ensure the emergence of a true consensus, accepted by both sides
of the Atlantic.

